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Ester: Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws

BORROWING STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND
CONFLICT OF LAWS*
JOHN

W. ESTER**

BASIC ISSUES UNDERLYING BORROWING STATUTES

On December 9, 1929, Phyllis Heath and her husband, both residents of Michigan, executed a note in that state payable in Ohio to
Jane Scott, a resident of Napoleon, Ohio. Approximately twenty
years after Mrs. Heath had last made any payment on the note, Mrs.
Scott's estate attempted to enforce the obligation by setting it off
against a bequest to Mrs. Heath. The Supreme Court of Ohio permitted the set-off over Mrs. Heath's objection that it was barred by
either the Ohio or the Michigan statute of limitations1 Mrs. Heath
pleaded that she "never did anything whatever to hamper the obligee
in the collection of the amount loaned, never moved from the place
where she, the obligor, always resided and never did anything to
justify the infliction of penalties or forfeitures against her . .. .,,
The court held that Ohio's "borrowing statute" was not applicable
because the cause of action arose in Ohio, where the note was payable,
rather than in Michigan, where it was executed and where Mrs. Heath
had continually resided. Therefore, the set-off was not barred by the
Michigan limitation of six years. Neither was it barred by the Ohio
limitation of fifteen years, because Mrs. Heath was a non-resident and
the prescriptive periods of Ohio do not begin to run until the obligor
becomes a resident of that state. In response to her contention that
this result is "repugnant to elementary principles of justice," the court
stated:3
"Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose and when they are
not applicable it is not unjust that a person who has received
full and complete consideration for the making of a contract
should be compelled to execute her part of it."
The end result of the court's reasoning and interpretation of applicable Ohio statutory provisions was that no statute of limitations
would bar enforcement of the claim in Ohio as long as Mrs. Heath
remained a non-resident.
*Portions of this article appear in a dissertation written in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws at the University of Illinois
College of Law.
"A.B. 1956, Pasadena College; J.D. 1959, Willamette University; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
1. Meekison v. Groschner, 153 Ohio St. 301, 91 N.E.2d 680 (1950).
2. Id. at 310, 91 N.E.2d at 684.
3. Id. at 311, 91 N.E.2d at 684-85.
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Mrs. Heath's plight poignantly illustrates some basic problems involved when a cause of action has contacts with more than one state,
and defendant alleges that the statute of limitations of some foreign
state bars the action in the forum because of the latter's borrowing
statute of limitations. Several factors that influenced the court in
disposing of Mrs. Heath's asserted defense can be detected:
(1) A reaction, possibly visceral, against the "justness" of allowing one to escape admitted liability because of the mere
passage of time;
(2) although not specifically mentioned by the court, application of the accepted common law conflicts rule that the
forum will apply its own periods of limitation as part of its
"procedural" law;
(3) refusal to apply the Ohio borrowing statute unless the
facts presented fitted precisely the court's interpretation of the
words used in the statute -perhaps based upon a desire to
avoid application of some "foreign" law unless clearly compelled
to do so; and finally,
(4) a possible predisposition toward a resident creditor in
the enforcement of his claim, although the court obviously did
not admit to such an inclination.
Each of these factors reflects the ethnocentric thinking that too often
is the basic starting point in a case involving conflict of laws. This
propensity to favor the forum's own law, and particularly its own
rules of "procedure," will be the primary concern of this discussion.
Borrowing statutes represent an inroad upon such ethnocentric thinking, and it shall be the purpose of this article to discover whether
this inroad is beneficial.
Two factors which might have influenced the Ohio court in rejecting Mrs. Heath's defense should be considered before dealing with
the narrow subject of borrowing statutes. First, what policy, if any,
is so meritorious that a court should refuse to enforce an admittedly
valid obligation on the sole ground that plaintiff has waited too long?
Second, why should a court apply its own prescriptive periods without considering competing interests which the two jurisdictions might
have in the enforceability of plaintiff's action? No satisfactory answer
can be given to either question, but the issues raised in attempting to
answer them so permeate the enactment and application of borrowing
statutes that both must be discussed in order to appreciate fully the
problems arising out of such legislation.
Policy Factors Underlying Statutes of Limitation
A court's attitude toward the "justness" of refusing to allow an
obligee to recover merely because he has been tardy in pressing his
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claim may have a direct bearing upon its attitude toward a borrowing statute. If the court favors asserted policy factors behind statutes
of limitation, a liberal construction of a borrowing statute is likely
to follow, and the court will be more easily persuaded to bar action
in the forum by reference to some foreign period of limitation. On
the other hand, if the court takes the position, as did the Ohio court
in Mrs. Heath's case, that the obligor "hired the money" and should
be compelled to pay even though the obligee has been lax in enforcing his claim, the court is likely to view a borrowing statute
through astigmatic eyes.
In most instances, statutes of limitation are applied with little or
no discussion as to why passage of time should operate to bar enforcement of an otherwise enforceable cause of action. Even in those few
instances in which some attention is directed to the "ought" of
statutory periods of limitation, the arguments made in justification
have become so standardized that a form list of policy considerations
might be printed and distributed for use in all cases in which an
issue of prescription might arise. A comment made by the Illinois
Supreme Court is typical:4
"Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose, intended to prescribe a definite limit of time within which the remedies included within their provisions must be prosecuted. They are
designed to afford security from stale demands, when, from
lapse of time, death of witnesses, failure of memory, loss of
vouchers, and other causes, the true state of the transaction may
be incapable of explanation and the rights of the parties cannot
be satisfactorily investigated."
"Statutes of repose" and "stale demand" seem to be the magic
words. But what do they mean in a case which does not involve the
possibility of "death of witnesses, failure of memory," and so forth?
In the case from which the foregoing quotation was taken, plaintiff
sought to enforce a judgment rendered in another state. It is possible
that the record of a foreign judgment might be lost, but since the
judgment could be found and examined, what bearing did the
memory of witnesses and "other causes" have on enforceability in
Illinois more than five years after the foreign judgment was rendered?
Mrs. Heath's case provides another example: she did not contend that
the note involved was not executed or that she did not in fact owe
the unpaid balance; liability was admitted. In such a case it is obvious that the magic words stale demand signify nothing if they
refer only to a policy of preventing enforcement of a claim that time
has rendered difficult of proof. However, time does render proof more
4.

Davis v. Munie, 235 Ill. 620, 621, 85 N.E. 943, 944 (1908).
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difficult in a wide variety of cases, and when such a case is involved,
there should be little argument with the proposition that plaintiff
should be required to enforce his cause of action within a reasonable
time. Perhaps all causes of action based upon tortious conduct in
which the facts involved must be established by means of personal
observation would fall within such a category, as would oral contracts and other transactions which must be proved solely by parol
evidence. In addition, time carries with it the possibility of loss or
obliteration of documentary evidence, and it would cause undue hardship to permit recovery when time has erased documentary evidence
of defendant's non-liability. But what of Mrs. Heath's case and enforcement of a foreign judgment? Is there any justification for disallowing recovery when liability is admitted, evidence has not been
lost, and time has in no way prejudiced the defendant in presenting
all available defenses?
Although in Mrs. Heath's case liability was admitted and time
had absolutely no effect upon a fair presentation of the operative
facts involved, it still seems that there was ample justification for
permitting her to avoid liability by pleading "stale demand." It
has been suggested that "in ordinary private civil litigation, the public
policy of limitations lies in avoiding the disrupting effect that unsettled
claims have on commercial intercourse."5 But perhaps the primary
justification for barring enforcement of an admittedly valid claim lies
in the importance of effective utilization of judicial machinery. At an
early date the United States Supreme Court suggested that "by requiring those who complain of injuries to seek redress by action at
law, within a reasonable time, a salutary vigilance is imposed, and an
end is put to litigation."6 If a "reasonable time" for the commencement of actions is established and an end put to litigation, it is
possible that some inconsequential or tenuous claims will be eliminated from the trial docket; the court may then concentrate upon
relatively current controversies pressed by anxious suitors and crowding the calendar. It is doubtful whether there is any value in completely uncontrolled access to judicial machinery, and it seems reasonable to require that those who wish to litigate in the courts do
so without undue delay.
The Forum'sApplication of its Own Statutes of Limitation
Two distinct types of statutes of limitation might arise in a case
calling for application of conflict of laws principles: first, positive
5. Note, Developments in the Law -Statutes of Limitations, 63
1177 (1950).
6. M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 279 (1830).
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prescription, or the Roman usucaptio, whereby one acquires title
to real or personal property; and, second, negative prescription, whereby one loses the right to litigate a cause of action.7 This distinction
is most articulately drawn in American statutes by the Louisiana
Civil Code, which categorizes prescription as either "acquisitive" or
"liberative."5 l Only the latter is involved when it is said that the
forum applies its own periods of limitation, for it is fairly well
settled that title acquired under the limitation laws of another jurisdiction will be recognized in the forum.9
In regard to "negative" or "liberative" prescription, American
courts have consistently taken the position that these statutory provisions regulate procedure only, and therefore the forum is to apply
its own periods of limitation.' 0 At an early date a few courts indicated, by way of dicta, that the rule might be otherwise if both
plaintiff and defendant had resided in the foreign jurisdiction for
the full period under its statutes, so the foreign law had "actually operated on the parties and on the case . . ."I" However, this rule was
12
not adopted by other courts dealing with this precise situation.
Today the general rule calls for application of the forum's own statute of limitations unless otherwise provided by legislative act or by
a specific exception engrafted upon the rule.' 3 Thus, if the forum's
statute of limitations has run, the action is barred, though not barred
7. Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 407 (1849).
8. LA. Cnv. CODE ANN. art. 3458 (1952) "Acquisitive prescription, definition.
The prescription by which the ownership of property is acquired, is a right by
which a mere possessor acquires the ownership of a thing which he possesses by
the continuance of his possession during the time fixed by law." LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
art. 3459 (1952) "Liberative prescription, definition. The prescription by which
debts are released, is a peremptory and perpetual bar to every species of action,
real or personal, when the creditor has been silent for a certain time without
urging his claim."
9. Shelby v. Guy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 361 (1826). See also, Waters v. Barton,
41 Tenn. 450 (1860); 1 WHARToN, CoNFLICT oF LAws 823 (3d ed. 1905).
10. "That the law of limitation of a foreign country, cannot of itself be pleaded
as a bar to an action in this Commonwealth, seems conceded; and is indeed too
well settled by authority to be drawn in question .... " Bulger v. Roche, 28 Mass.
(11 Pick.) 35, 37 (1831). Accord, Wells v. Alropa Corp., 82 F.2d 887 (D.C.Cir.
1936); Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Jones, 27 Cal. 2d 819, 167 P.2d 719 (1945);
Smith v. Kent Oil Co., 128 Colo. 80, 261 P.2d 149 (1953); Roper v. Monroe Grocer
Co., 171 La. 182, 129 So. 811 (1980).
11. Moores v. Winter, 67 Ark. 189, 196, 53 S.W. 1057 (1899) (dictum). A similar position was taken in Missouri prior to enactment of a borrowing statute in
that state. Williams v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 123 Mo. 573, 582, 27 S.W. 387 (1894)

(dictum).
12. See Thompson v. Reed, 75 Me. 404 (1883). Accord, Byrne v. Crowninshield, 17 Mass. 55 (1820); Crocker v. Arey, 3 R.I. 178 (1855).
13.

Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws, 31 MicH. L. Rxv. 474,

489 (1933); 3 BEALE,

CONFLiCr OF LAWS

1620 (1935).
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in the foreign jurisdiction in which it arose; 14 if the forum's statutory
period has not expired, the action may be maintained, though suit
is barred in the foreign jurisdiction. 15 Even when plaintiff must rely
upon a foreign statute to create his cause of action because of the
absence of such an action in the forum, he must nevertheless sue
within the time allowed in the forum.'6 This rule was apparently
promulgated by the gods, for it is "unalterable . . .either in England
1
or in the States of the United States, except by legislative enactment.""
that
Why is this so? There is no dissent from the proposition
the forum should apply its own rules of "procedure," properly so
called."' Practical necessity requires that the local bench and bar
must not be compelled to adjust their own modes of procedure to
comply with technical niceties which may exist in another state. But is
a statute of limitations properly characterized as a rule of procedure a rule that regulates the formal steps in a judicial proceeding?
The common law rule, hallowed by the rigor mortis of precedent,
is apparently always applied but frequently lamented. In the early
case of Le Roy v. Crowninshield,19 Justice Story was faced with the
necessity of applying or rejecting the procedural characterization, and
solely because of the force of precedent, the forum's statute of limitations was applied. Recognizing that it would be "rashness to ex'2
he nevertheless
pect to throw any new light upon [the subject],"
apply. 1
to
compelled
felt
he
rule
the
from
dissented in spirit
14.
FLICT

Potter v. Lefebvre, 95 N.H. 482, 66 A.2d 643 (1949);

OF LAWS §603

RESTATEMENT,

CON-

(1932).

15. Bell v. Kelly Motor Lines, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1951); Davison v.
Sasse, 72 S.D. 199, 31 N.W.2d 758 (1948); L. D. Powell Co. v. Larkin, 52 S.D. 245,
217 N.W. 200 (1927); Fletcher's Estate, 45 Pa. D. & C. 673 (Orphans Ct. 1942) (dictum); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §604 (1932).
16. O'Shields v. Georgia Pac. Ry., 83 Ga. 621, 10 S.E. 268 (1889).
17. Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 407, 414-15 (1849). See also
Heisel v. York, 46 N.M. 210, 125 P.2d 717 (1942); Graves v. Weeks, 19 Vt. 178
(1847).

18. In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1955), the
court made this observation: "While it might be desirable, in order to eliminate
'forum-shopping,' for the forum to apply the entire foreign law, substantive and
procedural- or at least as much of the procedural law as might significantly affect
the choice of forum, it has been recognized that to do so involves an unreasonable
burden on the judicial machinery of the forum . . .and perhaps more significantly.
on the local lawyers involved ... " See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 227 (3d ed.
1949); LFFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS 109 (1959); STULMBERC, CONFLICT OF LAWS 134
(2d ed. 1951).
19. 15 Fed. Cas. 362 (No. 8269) (C.C. Mass. 1820).

20. Id. at 364.
21. "Let us not deceive ourselves; there is no magic in words. Is the proposition, thus laid down, true to the extent, which the purpose, for which it is introduced, required? The distinction between a right and a remedy is admitted. But
can a right be truly said to exist upon a contract, when all remedy upon it is
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With the exception of Professor Ailes, who is attracted by the
"simplicity and convenience" 22 of the common law rule, most writers
in this field characterize statutes of limitation as "substantive" in
23
so far as they purport to deny any judicial relief to a tardy plaintiff.
2
In accord with the prevailing non-judicial opinion and the civil law, Professor Stumberg has suggested that limitation laws do not "deal
with the method of presenting the facts upon which a right depends
but with the legal effect of a fact, the lapse of time, upon a right which
the plaintiff claims, when that fact has been properly presented to the
court." 25 For this reason, "limitation of actions would seem upon an-

alysis to be substantive and not procedural .... ."26 In addition to
Professor Stumberg's assertion that limitation statutes do not deal
with the formal presentation of facts, one need only note the incongruity resulting when plaintiff must rely upon foreign law to establish his cause of action but defendant is not permitted to defeat that
action by reliance upon the same law. Regardless of the "simplicity
and convenience" of the common law rule, little can be said in its
favor when applied to permit plaintiff to recover for a tort or a
breach of contract established solely by reference to some foreign
law, notwithstanding the fact that he could not recover in the jurisdiction to which reference is made. Moreover, would it not be equally
simple and convenient to apply the limitation rules of the same
jurisdiction whose law establishes the existence of a tort or the breach
of a contract? In short, statutes of limitation do not regulate the
formal procedure of litigation, and there is no valid reason why the
forum should not apply the limitation rules of the same jurisdiction
to which reference is made for the purpose of finding a legally recognized cause of action.
legally extinguished?" 15 Fed. Cas. at 368. In answer to his own question, he
further asked: "What is the right of a contract, when the remedy is extinguished in
perpetuity?" 15 Fed. Cas. at S69.
22. Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws, 31 MiCH. L. REv. 474,
497 (1933).
23. "As an original proposition, it could well be urged, after suit is barred by
the law to which reference is made as governing the rights of the parties, the
plaintiff's claim, now deprived of its most valuable attribute, should be unenforceable by action elsewhere." GooDRIcH, CONFLICr OF LAws 241 (3d ed. 1949).
See LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS 120 (1959); 3 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS, A CoMPARATIVE STUDY 483 (1950); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 147 (2d ed. 1951); Nordstrom, Ohio's Borrowing Statute of Limitations - A Quaking Quagmire in a Dismal
Swamp, 16 OHIo ST. L.J. 183 (1955). See also, Comment, 35 TExAs L. REV. 95
(1956), for a collection of arguments and authorities for and against the American
procedural characterization, and Comment, 28 YALE.J. 492 (1919), for an explanation of the evolution of the American rule in terms of "historical accident."
24. 3 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAws, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 475 (1950).
25. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 147 (2d ed. 1951).
26. Ibid.
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Reasons for Enactment
Because of the labyrinth created by the various legislatures which
have enacted borrowing statutes, the courts often find it necessary to
look for some motivating force in order to intelligently interpret and
apply the particular statute involved. Among the various policy factors that have been suggested are the following:
(1) The West Virginia court, after finding a presumption
that a contract executed between residents of a foreign jurisdiction is to be performed in that jurisdiction, intimated that application of the foreign statute of limitations might conform
with an implied intent on the part of the contracting parties.27
This suggestion has little appeal because there is no necessity
to compound the confusion already existing in this area by applying a legal fiction of questionable merit.
(2) The Illinois court, impressed by the extensive nature
of credit and the unprecedented change and growth of trade,
has taken the position that borrowing legislation would encourage this growth by barring unsettled claims of long duration. 2s
(3) The Nevada court, in support of the domestic borrowing
statute, asserted that it would discourage non-residents from
litigating issues which might have been litigated elsewhere,
thus partially solving the problem of congestion in its courts.2 9
(4) The frequent averment that borrowing statutes discourage forum shopping 30 is founded on reasoning similar to
that which prompts Nevada's desire to avoid congestion and
to operate its judicial machinery primarily for the benefit of
local residents. In many instances the statutory period is longer
in the state in which defendant is presently subject to suit than
in the state in which the cause of action arose. If plaintiff's
action is already barred by the law of the latter jurisdiction,
some feel that he should not benefit from the availability of a
more liberal forum.
(5) In a limited number of states the avowed purpose of
27. Davidson v. Browning, 73 W. Va. 276, 80 S.E. 363 (1913).
28. Hyman v. Bayne, 83 Il1. 256 (1876).
29. Wing v. Wiltsee, 47 Nev. 350, 359, 223 Pac. 334, 336 (1924). Accord, Kirsch
v. Lubin, 131 Misc. 700, 228 N.Y. Supp. 94 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
30. Moore v. Roschen, 93 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Pack v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 50 Del. 413, 132 A.2d 54 (1957); Fenton v. Sinclair Refining Co., 283
P.2d 799, 805 (Okla. 1955) (dictum).
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borrowing legislation is to encourage immigration. 31 In Arizona and Texas 32 a defendant whose liability is barred by some
foreign law is not entitled to plead that law in defense of a local
action unless he becomes a resident of the forum. This policy
has been expressed by the Texas court in no uncertain terms:
Immigrants are thus invited "by the strongest inducements
"33

(6) Finally, several courts justify borrowing statutes because
it is allegedly unfair to expose defendants to suit in the forum
after they have acquired repose under the law of the state in
which they resided and the cause of action arose.3 4 However,
before this hardship will arise, the forum's period of limitation
must be longer than the statute of limitations in defendant's
prior residence, thus permitting a suit that is barred in the
latter state. On the other hand, perhaps there is an element
of "unfairness" to the creditor when the forum's shorter statute of limitation is applied. If unfairness to the creditor does
result, borrowing statutes have not alleviated the situation,
because the forum's shorter period is generally applied notwithstanding the availability of a borrowing statute.3 5
Apart from these particular policy factors two more basic reasons
may be found for widespread enactment of borrowing legislation.
First, as a matter of policy, 36 there is no sound reason why an obligee
should be entitled to recover in the forum if his action has been fully
barred by the law of the state in which it arose, particularly when
both parties were residents of that state for its full statutory period
31. Van Dorn v. Bodley, 38 Ind. 402, 413 (1871) (dissenting opinion); Robinson v. Moore, 76 Miss., 89, 103, 23 So. 631, 633 (1898) (semble); Copus v. California,
158 Tex. 196, 301 S.W.2d 217 (1957); Continental Supply Co. v. Hutchings, 267
S.W.2d 914, 915-16 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
32. Aiz REv. STAT. ANN. §12-506 (A) (1956); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5542
(1958).
33. Snoddy v. Cage, 5 Tex. 106, 114 (1849). Although the court was dealing
with the Texas absent defendant tolling provision, the same policy appears to
underlie both statutes.
34. Minniece v. Jeter, 65 Ala. 222, (1880); Robinson v. Moore, 76 Miss. 89, 23
So. 631 (1898); Jamieson v. Potts, 55 Ore. 292, 105 Pac. 93 (1909); 3 RABEL, Cotmucr
oF LAws, A COMPARATIVE STuDy 511 (1950); Note, 63 HARv. L. Rv. 1177 (1950).
Contra, Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws, 31 Micss. L. REv.

474 (1933). Professor Ailes argues that borrowing statutes represent "... an unwarranted departure from principle. It indicates a solicitude for the peace of
mind of defaulting debtors which is extraordinary to say the least, and a failure
to discern the real nature of the defense of limitation." Ailes, supra at 501.
35. The question whether a borrowing statute will operate to extend the
forum's prescriptive period is discussed infra.
36. According to Professor Ailes, borrowing statutes are based on "policy, not
principle." Ailes, supra note 34, at 501. This point may be conceded without also
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and defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of its courts. If the
right of action has been extinguished, this defense should accompany
defendant to each jurisdiction in which he might subsequently reside.3 7
Second, the prevailing interpretation of tolling statutes based on defendant's absence from the enacting jurisdiction, coupled with the
rule requiring the forum to apply its own periods of limitation, has
resulted in the possibility of perpetual liability for an ambulatory
defendant. Although these statutes are not uniform, all but three38
fall into three basic groups. The first group, composed of twenty-one
jurisdictions,39 is typified by section 351 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure:
"If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is
out of the State, the action may be commenced within the term
herein limited, after his return to the State .....
(Emphasis
added.)
Section 19 of the New York Civil Practice Act is typical of the seven40
teen jurisdictions in the second group:
"If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is
without the state, the action may be commenced, within the
accepting his proposition that such legislation represents an unwarranted departure
from principle. See note 34, supra.
37. Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 15 Fed. Cas. 362, (No. 8269) (C.C. Mass. 1820).
Accord, Karagiannis v. Shaffer, 96 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Minniece v. Jeter,
65 Ala. 222 (1880); Note, 4 DUKE L.J. 71 (1954).
38. ARK. STAT. ANN. §37-231 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. §8-33 (1957); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §5409 (1955).
39. ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. §55-2-14 (1949); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-501
(1956); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §351; FLA. STAT. §95.07 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. §3-805
(1949); HAWAII REV. LAWS §241-8 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. §5-229 (1947); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §413.190 (1955) (applicable only in favor of a resident); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §541.13 (1959); Mo. ANN. STAT. §516.200 (1949) (applicable only in
favor of a resident); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §93-2702 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT.
§11.300 (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-21 (Supp. 1959); N.D. CENT. CODE §28-0132
(1960); ORE. REV. STAT. §12.150 (1961); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §9-1-18 (1956); S.C.
CODE §10-103 (1952); S.D. CODE §33.0203 (Supp. 1960); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN,.
art. 5537 (1958); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-35 (1953); Wis. STAT. ANN. §330.30 (Supp.

1961) (not applicable if neither party is a resident).
40. CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §87-1-30 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §8116 (1953);
D.C. CODE ANN. §12-205 (1961) (applicable only in favor of a resident); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 83, §19 (Smith-Hurd 1959) (not applicable if neither party is a resident);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §60-309 (1949); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 112, §111 (1954);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 57, §5 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, §9 (1956); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §27.609 (1938); NEB. REV. STAT. §25-214 (1956); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. Act §19;
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §2305.15 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §98 (1951);
TENN. CODE ANN. §28-112 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §552 (1959) (not appli-

cable if both parties resided in the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §4.16.180

(1961); WYO. STAT. ANN.
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time limited therefore, after his coming into or return to the
state .... " (Emphasis added.)
The third group consists of only nine states. 41 Title 7, section 34, of
the Alabama Code is illustrative:
"When any person is absent from the state during the period
within which a suit might have been brought against him, the
time of such absence must not be computed as a portion of the
time necessary to create a bar under this chapter."
Based primarily upon the impetus provided by Chief Justice Kent
in the early case of Ruggles v. Keeler4 ? the overwhelming majority
of courts have held that statutes of limitation have no operative
effect until defendant comes into the forum. 43 In those jurisdictions
having statutes similar to that of New York, this result would seem to
follow from the terms of the statute itself. 44 In those jurisdictions
having a statute similar to the one in California, the courts have
reached the same result by steadfastly declaring that "return" means
both "return" and "enter for the first time." 45 Because of such interpretations of absent defendant statutes, the following might result
41. ALA. CODE tit. 7, §34 (1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §52-590 (Supp. 1959)
(but the time so excluded is not to exceed seven years); IND. ANN. STAT. §2-606 (a)
(Supp. 1959); IowA CODE ANN. §614.6 (1946); Miss. CODE ANN. §740 (1942) (applicable only if the cause of action accrued in Mississippi); N.H. R.v. STAT. ANN.
§508.9 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A: 14-22 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. §23-1-9 (1953)
(applicable if defendant "shall have been" absent after the cause of action arose);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §40 (1953) (applicable only if the cause of action arose in
Pennsylvania).
42. 3 Johns. Cas. 263 (N.Y. 1808).
43. Vernon, The Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act:
Tolling Problems, 12 VAND. L. Rav. 971, 982 (1959).
44. E.g., Adams v. Frank, 213 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Stock Exch. Bank v.
Wykes, 88 Kan. 750, 129 Pac. 1131 (1913); Osborn v. Swetnam, 221 Md. 216, 156
A.2d 654 (1959). The Illinois absent defendant statute is expressly applicable only
if one or both of the parties was a resident of Illinois when the cause of action
accrued. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §19 (Smith-Hurd 1959). Thus, when a judgment
was rendered by a Missouri court between residents of that state, the Illinois limitation on enforcement of foreign judgments began to run on the date judgment
was entered in Missouri, and not when defendant subsequently moved to Illinois.
Davis v. Munie, 235 Il1. 620, 85 N.E. 943 (1908). However, if plaintiff is a resident
of Illinois when the cause of action accrues, the statute of limitation will not begin
to run until defendant comes into Illinois, and if he never becomes a resident, the
Illinois statutory period is not available as a defense. Mitchell v. Comstock, 305
Ill. App. 360, 27 N.E.2d 620, 624 (1940).
45. E.g., Alaska Credit Bureau of Juneau v. Fenner, 80 F. Supp. 7 (D.C.
Alaska 1948); Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Hilvert, 63 Ariz. 171, 160 P.2d 331
(1945); Van Deren v. Lory, 87 Fla. 422, 100 So. 794 (1924); Contra, Miller v.
Rackley, 199 Ga. 370, 34 S.E.2d 438 (1945); United States Royalty Ass'n v. Stiles,
131 S.W.2d 1060, 1064 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
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in the absence of a borrowing statute. Assume that P and D were
residents of State X, where P's cause of action arose, and that they
continued to reside in that state for a period of ten years. D subsequently moved to State Y, and after maintaining his residence in that
state for ten years, he moved to the forum. P finally commenced
action after D had resided in the forum for four years. Assume further
that the applicable period of limitation is five years in all three states.
P may recover despite the fact that a total period of twenty-four years
has elapsed. D may not plead the limitation laws of either State X
or State Y because the common law rule requires application of the
forum's own prescriptive periods; and according to the prevailing
interpretation of absent defendant statutes, neither may he plead
the forum's statute of limitation, because he has resided in that
state for one year less than the five years required.46 If there is any
justification for barring "stale demands," it is clear that such a result
is absurd. The forum's interest in effectuating policy factors underlying its rules of limitation is completely defeated. However, if the
forum had a borrowing statute, P could not have enforced a stale
claim already twice barred, and D would not be liable merely because
he lacked foresight and moved to the forum.
Classificationof Borrowing Statutes
After reading the classifications offered in the attached appendices,
one might borrow a criticism from Justice Holmes and claim that
unnecessary confusion results from "striving for a useless quintessence
of all systems, instead of an accurate anatomy of one." 47 Any attempt
to analyze all borrowing statutes will result in a certain degree of confusion because of the heterogeneous hodge-podge which a complete
compilation of such statutes presents.48 However, a comparison of all
borrowing statutes will not result in a "useless quintessence" for at
least two reasons: (1) Since uniform legislation seems desirable,49 it
is important to study all pertinent legislation to discover whether
conflict exists, and why; (2) much of the prevailing judicial confusion
in this area seems to result from an inaccurate comparison of the
46. See Kirsch v. Lubin, 131 Misc. 700, 288 N.Y. Supp. 94 (Sup. Ct. 1927);
Crocker v. Arey, 3 R.I. 178 (1855); L. D. Powell Co. v. Larkin, 52 S.D. 245, 217
N.W. 200 (1927); 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1622 (1935); Note, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1177 (1950); Note, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 762 (1935).
47. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 475 (1897).
48. One writer has commented that borrowing statutes are "so diverse that
their main effect has been to produce almost universal confusion." LFrLAR, CONFLICT
OF LAWS

120 (1959).

49. 3 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 522 (1950); Vernon,
Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY
MT. L. REV. 287, 323-28 (1960).
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local borrowing statute with that of a sister state. By failing to study
the wording of foreign statutes, many courts have improperly distinguished between two apparently similar statutes or have overlooked
common features of two apparently dissimilar statutes. It is hoped
that segregation of the numerous variables involved and classification
of such variables according to common features may be valuable in
both respects.
To determine the applicability and effect of a borrowing statute,
three basic questions should be asked. First, must the cause of action
come from within or without the enacting jurisdiction; and if the
latter is required, from which jurisdiction having contacts with plaintiff's alleged cause of action? Second, in what jurisdiction must the
parties have resided at the time the cause of action was first recognized? And, third, assuming that both questions are answered in
favor of applying the borrowing statute, which jurisdiction's law determines whether plaintiff's action in the forum is timely? In regard
to most borrowing statutes, it is necessary to answer all three questions; therefore, they are used in appendix A as the basic framework
for classifying the various statutory provisions.
PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION COMMON TO MOST
BORROWING STATUTES

In spite of the variations among borrowing statutes, there are
problems of interpretation and application more or less common to
all. Most statutes require that the cause of action have its basic
or initial contacts with some foreign jurisdiction; thus it becomes
necessary for the court to determine where plaintiff's action "arose,"
"accrued," or "originated," depending upon the particular word
chosen by the legislature. Once the court decides that the action
has sufficient contact with a given foreign jurisdiction, it must determine how much of the foreign law is to be "borrowed." Will the
court apply only the foreign limitation period, or will it also apply
other foreign "laws" that might affect the running of that period?
And finally, where the foreign period is longer than that provided in
the analogous domestic statute, did the legislature intend to extend
the time within which suit can be commenced in the forum? Most
statutes provide no indication as to where a cause of action "arises,"
how much of the foreign law should be borrowed, or whether a
longer foreign prescriptive period will operate to extend the time
within which plaintiff could otherwise commence his action.
Origins of Actions
Most borrowing statutes are applicable only if the cause of action,
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when first recognized as such, had its basic contacts with some foreign
jurisdiction. 5 If a note is executed and made payable in the forum,
its borrowing statute is not applicable although defendant was a nonresident on the date of execution, and even though plaintiff subsequently moves to the state of defendant's residence, where both
parties continue to reside for the full period of limitation under that
state's law. 51 Such a result would be rejected in Nebraska, where
the court is not trammeled by an arising-out-of-the-state requirement.In Webster v. Davies33 the defendant was a resident of Nebraska when
various notes were executed and matured. He then moved to Wyoming, where he remained amenable to suit for three years beyond the
WAyoming prescriptive period. When he returned to Nebraska and
was sued in that state, the court held that "it is immaterial, under
our statute . . .where the cause of action arose, or where the de-

fendant resided when it arose. If he has resided in another state so
long as to be protected by the statute of that state, such fact is a good
5"
Similar results, based on essentially the
defense to an action here.
same facts, have been reached in Minnesota and Illinois despite specific statutory requirements that the cause of action arise "outside of
this state." 55 In Pattridge v. Palmer5 6 the Minnesota court based its
decision on the theory that the cause of action arose simultaneously
in Minnesota, where the notes were payable, and in California, where
defendant resided and was subject to suit. Thus, the cause of action
arose "outside" Minnesota. A federal district court in Illinois also
sustained a defense based on a foreign statute of limitations, although
the note involved was executed and made payable in Illinois and defendant was a resident of that state when it became due.5 By permitting defendant to enjoy a peaceful and litigation-free ten years in

Missouri after the note matured, plaintiff lost his right to sue because
his action "arose" not only in Illinois but also in Missouri, where defendant subsequently became subject to the jurisdiction of that state's
courts.
The views just discussed serve as an introduction to the problem:
Where must a cause of action have its basic contacts? Most statutes
specifically require that the cause of action arise outside the enacting
jurisdiction before the borrowing provision is operative. But assuming that sufficient non-domestic contacts do exist, the problem of
50. See Appendix A.
51.

Gamble v. Gamble, 79 Ohio L. Abs. 311, 155 N.E.2d 266 (C.P. 1957).

52.
53.
54.
55.

NF1. REV. STAT. §25-215 (1956).
44 Neb. 301, 62 N.AV. 484 (1895).
Webster v. Davies, supra note 53, at 306, 62 N.W. at 486.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §21 (Smith-Hurd 1959); MINN.

STAT. ANN.

§541.14

(1959).
56. 201 Minn. 387, 277 N.W. 18 (1937), 51 HARV. L. REv. 1290 (1938).
1882).
57. Osgood v. Artt, 10 Fed. 365 (N.D. Ill.
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where a cause of action "arises" also has significance in relation to
choice of law. For example, if residents of Indiana execute a contract
in Kansas to be performed in Ohio and suit is prosecuted in Illinois,
the Illinois court will apply the statute of limitations of the state in
which the cause of action "arose." Thus, a determination of the
"locus" of a cause of action may at the same time resolve two issues:
applicability of the forum's borrowing statute and choice of law to
be applied.
a. Tort Actions
The courts unanimously hold that a cause of action sounding in
tort arises in the jurisdiction where the last act necessary to establish
liability occurred.58 The rhetorical question of whether a cause of
action can arise in a state in which defendant is not amenable to
service of process is not even raised. The statute of limitations of the
jurisdiction in which injury was received is applied notwithstanding
the fact that defendant has never been a resident of that jurisdiction.5 9
Thus, if plaintiff's property is converted in the forum, its borrowing
statute is not available, although defendant was a non-resident at
the time of his tortious activity.60 If plaintiff is assaulted by defendant's employee and action is commenced against the employer for
negligently retaining a pugnacious hired hand, the cause of action
"originated" in the state where plaintiff was assaulted.61 And if
plaintiff is injured in an automobile collision in Virginia, the statute
of limitations of that state is applied, although plaintiff was a resident of New York, defendant was a resident of Florida, and suit was
commenced in the federal district court in Pennsylvania.62
The "place of injury" rule is also applied in cases where the tort
involved might possibly be said to have had its origin in another
state. In Moore v. Roschen,6 3 defendant manufactured "Gene Autry"
cowboy suits in New York. The infant plaintiff, a resident of Pennsylvania, purchased such a suit in Pennsylvania and was injured in
that state when the suit caught fire. In a similar case, Sylvania Elec.
58. E.g., Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956); Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1957);

McLendon v. Kissick, 363 Mo. 264, 250 S.W.2d 489 (1952); Drummy v. Oxman,
280 App. Div. 800, 113 N.Y.S.2d 224 (2d Dep't 1952).
59. See, e.g., Colello v. Sundquist, 137 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Smith v.
Bain, 123 F. Supp. 632 (M.D. Pa. 1954); Hornsey v. Jacono, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 291
(C.P. 1957).
60. Janeway v. Burton, 201 I1. 78, 66 N.E. 337 (1903).
61. Burgert v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1957). The court concluded that the cause of action originated in Kansas but did not fully explain why.
62. Smith v. Bain, 123 F. Supp. 632 (M.D. Pa. 1954).
63. 93 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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Products, Inc. v. Barker,64 the defendant corporation manufactured
neon tubing in Massachusetts which was purchased by plaintiff's
employer in Nebraska. The plaintiff contracted berylliosis as a consequence of blowing the beryllium-coated tubing by mouth. In both
cases the court held that the cause of action arose in the state where
injury was received-not in the state where the product was manufactured and where defendant's negligence presumably occurred.6
Therefore, the question-where does a tort cause of action "arise,"
"accrue," or "originate"? -is answered without complication or dissent: where the last act necessary to establish liability occurred.
b. ContractActions
Although no particular difficulty is involved in determining where
a tort "arises," "accrues," or "originates," these concepts become
fraught with ambiguity where plaintiff's cause of action is founded
upon a contract.6 6 Assume in the following case that the appropriate
statute of limitations in each jurisdiction involved is two years.
Maker executed a note in State A on January 1, 1950, payable in
State E on January 1, 1951. On the date of execution Maker was a
resident of State A and Payee resided in State E. On February 1,
1950, Maker moved to State B and in May of the same year wrote
Payee, unequivocally repudiating all liability under the instrument.
The following month Maker moved to State C, where he resided on
January 1, 1951, when the note matured. On January 1, 1952, before
the two-year period of State C had expired, Maker moved to State D.
Having satiated his peripatetic inclinations, he retained his residence
in State D until January 1, 1961. On that date Payee fortuitousl
served Maker in State F, the forum, where Maker was enjoying a
brief vacation. Where did the cause of action arise? Six possibilities
are present: (1) State A, where the note was executed and where
Maker was then a resident; (2) State E, where the note was payable and
where it shall be assumed that Payee has always resided; (3) State B,
where Maker resided when he anticipatorily repudiated all liability
under the note; (4) State C, where Maker was a resident when the
note matured; (5) State D, where Maker subsequently resided and
was subject to suit for the full statutory period of that jurisdiction;
64. 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956).
65. Accord, Young v. Hicks, 250 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1957); Fulkerson v. American

Chain & Cable Co., 72 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1947); McGrath v. Helena Rubinstein, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).

66. "Unfortunately, these statutes are of different types, and all of them are
awkwardly drafted. Most of them identify the competent foreign statute by
pointing to the law of the place where the cause of action 'arose' or 'occurred,' a
language adequate only for tort actions." 3 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWs: A CostPARATIVE STUDY

510 (1950).
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and (6) State F, the forum, where Maker was found and was subject to in personam jurisdiction. While this hypothetical case is
slightly exaggerated, courts have selected all but the last alternative
as a "locus" for specific causes of action.
Before discussing these various possibilities, it is necessary to define the terms that have caused such a wide divergence of judicial
opinion. Borrowing statutes use several different words or phrases to
indicate where the cause of action must have its basic contacts. Although the word most frequently used is "arise," "accrue" is found in
several statutes and "originate" in one. 67 Judicial decisions are of
little assistance in defining these terms, because a definition is available to suit almost any purpose. For example, Iowa, Kansas, and
Oklahoma are all "arise" jurisdictions.6 8 The Kansas court has argued
that no distinction can be drawn between "arises" and "accrues":
"The words 'when a cause of action has arisen' in a foreign state...
mean when the cause of action has accrued in a foreign state ... - 69
On the other hand, the Iowa court felt that "the right to institute
action 'accrues'when by maturity of the note and default in payment
the holder may maintain a suit thereon, but it 'arises' or has its
origin in the transaction which brought the obligation into existence." 70 Taking a slightly different position, the Oklahoma court
held that "a cause of action arises when the obligation was created
which gave rise to a right of action as soon as such right accrued
2
thereon." 7' In Mississippi and Montana, both "accrues" jurisdictions,7
the courts use the terms arise and accrue interchangeably, assuming
without explanation that both words have the same legal meaning.73
Intentionally excluded from this sampling is the further issue as to
whether a cause of action can arise or accrue in a jurisdiction where
defendant is not then amenable to suit. To compound confusion, the
diligent researcher need ask only one additional question: Can a cause
of action arise in more than one jurisdiction at the same time, or,
having once arisen in a given jurisdiction, can it subsequently arise in
another jurisdiction where suit might be maintained? In answer to
this question, the California, Idaho, and Kansas courts assert that a
cause of action "in a legal sense," whatever that may mean, can arise
67. See pp. 1-2 of Appendix A infra.
68. IowA CODE ANN. §614.7 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §60-310 (1949);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §99 (1951).
69. Bruner v. Martin, 76 Kan. 862, 93 Pac. 165 (1907) (Emphasis added.)
70. Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa 451, 460, 123 N.W. 202, 205 (1909). (Emphasis
added.)
71. Doughty v. Funk, 15 Okla. 643, 649, 84 Pac. 484, 486 (1906). (Emphasis
added.)
72. Miss. CODE ANN. §741 (1942); MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. §93-2717 (1947).
73. Lowry v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 220 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1955);
Chevrier v. Robert, 6 Mont. 319, 12 Pac. 702 (1887).
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in but one place.74 On the other hand, the Illinois and Minnesota
courts accept a multiple place of arising theory and hold that a cause
of action may arise initially in more than one jurisdiction 75 or may
subsequently arise when defendant becomes amenable to process in
a second jurisdiction.76

This confusion illustrates more than mere quibbling over words,
since the outcome of a particular lawsuit may depend directly upon
the definition adopted by the court. Unfortunately, few cases have
formulated a definition based on the rationale underlying borrowing
statutes. Borrowing statutes are enacted for the purpose of refusing
to enforce a cause of action which was not, but could have been,
seasonably enforced in some other jurisdiction. If plaintiff has had
a reasonable time within which to bring action in any given jurisdiction where defendant was amenable to process but has failed to
do so within the period of limitation provided by that state, there is
no good reason why the forum should open its courts merely because
its prescriptive period is more liberal and plaintiff fortuitously served
defendant within its borders. This underlying rationale is discernible
only by inference in those statutes borrowing the limitation laws of
the jurisdiction where the cause of action "arose," et cetera. To effectively perpetuate the policy behind such legislation, the place where
the cause of action "arose" should not control, and the courts should
not be forced to devise strained definitions for penumbral verbiage.
In attempting to interpret the two statutory requirements mentioned - that the cause of action "arise" in another jurisdiction and
that the borrowed law be that of the state where the cause of action
"arises" - the courts have developed three frequently recurring theories which call for reference to the place of performance, the place of
contracting, or the place where defendant was amenable to service
of process.
A majority of the courts hold that arise or accrue necessarily refers
to the jurisdiction in which the contract was to be performed.

7
7

If

no place of performance was specifically mentioned in the contract, it
is assumed that performance was intended in the jurisdiction in
5
which defendant was then a resident 8
74. McKee v. Dodd, 152 Cal. 637, 93 Pac. 854 (1908); West v. Theis, 15 Idaho
167, 96 Pac. 932 (1908); Hayes Land & Inv. Co. v. Basset, 85 Kan. 48, 116 Pac.
475 (1911).
75. Pattridge v. Palmer, 201 Minn. 387, 277 N.W. 18 (1937), 51 HARV. L. REv.
1290 (1938).
76.

Osgood v. Artt, 10 Fed. 365 (N.D. II1. 1882); Hyman v. McVeigh, 87 111.

708 (1877).
77. E.g., C. & L. Rural Elec. Co-op. v. Kincade, 175 F. Supp. 223 (N.D. Miss.
1959); Cvecich v. Giardino, 37 Cal. App. 2d 394, 99 P.2d 573 (1940); Hobbs v.
Ludlow, 199 Ind. 733, 160 N.E. 450 (1928); Meekison v. Groschner, 153 Ohio St.

301, 91 N.E.2d 680 (1950).
78. Pond Creek Mill & Elevator Co. v. Clark, 270 Fed. 482 (7th Cir. 1920);
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In support of the theory that reference should be made to the
place of contracting, that is, where the cause of action "originated,"
the result in some cases has been based upon statutory use of this
specific word or similar language, while other courts have reached
the same conclusion by construing "arise" to mean "originate." The
Alabama and Missouri borrowing statutes clearly call for application
of the law of the jurisdiction in which the cause of action originated,
the former referring to the foreign jurisdiction in which the contract
was made 7 and the latter to the jurisdiction in which it "originated."80
In compliance with this specific statutory language, the courts in both
states have held that their borrowing statutes have no effect if the
contract involved was executed in the forum.8 ' A similar result has
also been reached in several states not having such statutory language.
In Moran v. Moran,8 2 plaintiff, an Iowa resident, filed suit in that
state against a resident of Michigan. The last act necessary to execute
the contract in question took place in Iowa rather than in Michigan.
The defendant contended that the cause of action could not arise in
Iowa because of his continuous residence in Michigan; the Iowa court
rejected this contention and stated that "the right to institute action
'accrues' when by maturity of the note and default in payment the
holder may maintain a suit thereon, but it 'arises' or has its origin in
the transaction which brought the obligation into existence."83
Although not as articulate as the Iowa court, an Oklahoma court
came to the same conclusion when it held that arise, as distinguished
from accrue, has reference to the beginning or origin of a right of
action, "as soon as such right accrued thereon."8s1 The position taken
by both the Oklahoma and Iowa courts is untenable. In Swift v.
Clay8s the Kansas court convincingly argued that "the giving of a
note, which is the making of a contract, does not give rise to a cause
of action. Surely every simple business transaction between men does
not give provocation for a lawsuit. It was not the making, execution,
and delivery of this note which gave rise to the cause of action; it was
not the promise to pay, but the breaking of that promise .... ,,6
Hobbs v. Ludlow, 199 Ind. 733, 160 N.E. 450 (1928).
79. ALA. CODE tit. 7, §34 (1960).
80. Mo. ANN. STAT. §516.180 (1949).

81. Wright v. Strauss &Co., 73 Ala. 227 (1882); Williams v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
360 Mo. 501,229 S.W.2d 1 (1950).
82. 144 Iowa 451, 123 N.W. 202 (1909).
83. Moran v. Moran, supra note 82, at 460, 123 N.W. at 205.
84. Doughty v. Funk, 15 Okla, 643, 649, 84 Pac. 484, 486 (1906).
85. 127 Kan. 148, 272 Pac. 170 (1928).
86. Swift v. Clay, supra note 85, at 149, 272 Pac. at 171. Accord, Bruner v.
Martin, 76 Kan. 862, 93 Pac. 165 (1907); Freundt v. Hahn, 24 Wash. 8, 63 Pac.

1107 (1901).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1962

19

UNIVERSITY
OF
FLORIDA
LAW
Florida Law
Review,
Vol. 15,
Iss. 1 REVIEW
[1962], Art. 3

The theory that a cause of action arises or accrues in the jurisdiction where defendant is amenable to service of process is based on
the belief that a cause of action cannot exist in a jurisdiction in which
a remedy is not available. Courts carrying this basic proposition to its
logical conclusion have held that a cause of action initially arises in
the jurisdiction in which the obligor may be sued on the date of performance, and that an action also arises in each jurisdiction in which
defendant might subsequently become amenable to suit. Illinois
is the leading advocate of this theory, which had its origin in Hyman
87
v. McVeigh:
"The words 'when a cause of action has arisen,' as they occur
in the statute pleaded, should be construed as meaning, when
jurisdiction exists in the courts of a state to adjudicate between
the parties upon the particular cause of action, if properly invoked; or, in other words, when the plaintiff has the right to
sue the defendant in the courts of the state upon the particular
cause of action, without regard to the place where the cause of
action had its origin."
In an action based on a note executed and payable in Texas, an Illinois court applied this doctrine and held that the Illinois borrowing
statute was not applicable because defendant was a resident of Illinois
when the note matured.88 It has also been held that a cause of action
arises in each state where the debtor subsequently becomes amenable to
service of process, and if action has been fully barred according to the
laws of any such jurisdiction, action is barred in Illinois. s9 The
Hyman v. McVeigh interpretation of the word arises has also been
adopted in Kansas, Minnesota, and Nevada. 90 In Hays Land & Investment Co. v. Basset9 the Kansas court held that plaintiff's action was
barred by expiration of the Nebraska statutory period (the jurisdiction in which defendant resided on the date his note matured), although the note was executed and payable in Kansas. In Minnesota
and Nevada the leading cases of Luce v. Clarke92 and Lewis v. Hyams9have firmly established the rule that a cause of action, for purposes
87. 87 Ill. 708 (1877).
88. National Bank of Denison v. Danahy, 89 Ill. App. 92 (1899).
89. Osgood v. Artt, 10 Fed. 365 (N.D. Ill. 1882); Humphrey v. Cole, 14 Ill.
App. 56 (1883).
90. Timmonds v. Messner, 109 Kan. 518, 200 Pac. 270 (1921); Pattridge v.
Palmer, 201 Minn. 387, 277 N.W. 18 (1937); Wing v. Wiltsee, 47 Nev. 350, 223 Pac.
334 (1924).
91. 85 Kan. 48, 116 Pac. 475 (1911).
92. 49 Minn. 356, 51 N.W. 1162 (1892). But cf. Powers Mercantile Co. v.
Blethen, 91 Minn. 339, 97 N.W. 1056 (1904), in which the court appeared to adopt
a place of origin theory.
93. 26 Nev. 68, 63 Pac. 126 (1900).
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of borrowing a foreign period of limitation, arises in any state where
4

defendant may be foundY

Unfortunately, most courts have construed the word ariseliterally.05
The facts involved in the California case of McKee v. Dodd96 illustrate
a possible result when the Hyman v. McVeigh doctrine is rejected.
Decedent and plaintiff were both residents of New York when decedent executed a note payable in that state. Prior to the date of
maturity decedent left New York, residing first in California and
then in Honolulu until his death. Despite the fact that the Hawaiian
period had fully run while decedent was a resident of that jurisdiction, the court held that the California borrowing statute makes reference "only to the primary and original jurisdiction in which the
cause of action arises, and does not contemplate other jurisdictions
in which a cause of action may arise or accrue, depending upon the
peripatetic inclinations of the defendant . . . ."9 Thus, the cause of
action "arose" in New York, where decedent was not subject to suit
on or after the date the note matured; and as long as he did not reside in California for its full statutory period, action would never
be barred in that state.
In an attempt to justify a result similar to that of McKee, the
Idaho courts in West v. Theis9s suggested that if a cause of action
arose in each state to which a defendant moved, the plaintiff would
have to hire a detective force and a law firm to keep him posted on
the whereabouts of the defendant and the statutes of limitation in
each jurisdiction in which defendant settled. This justification would
seem to have little foundation in fact unless the court assumed that
all debtors who change their places of residence do so for the purpose
of fraudulently hindering collection of their obligations. In the West
case plaintiff had no difficulty in commencing his action in Idaho, although the notes involved were executed and payable in Kansas; and
there is nothing in the opinion to indicate that plaintiff could not also
have commenced action with equal facility in Washington, where the
maker resided for that state's full statutory period.
A few cases have held that a cause of action cannot arise in a jurisdiction in which a full and adequate remedy is not available. For
94. See Lewis v. Hyams, supra note 93, at 71, 63 Pac. at 127. The underlying
reason for applying the Hyman v. McVeigh doctrine may be found in a statement
by the Minnesota court in Luce v. Clarke, 49 Minn. at 359, 51 N.W. at 1163.
95. E.g., McKee v. Dodd, 152 Cal. 637, 93 Pac. 854 (1908); West v. Theis, 15
Idaho 167, 96 Pac. 932 (1908); Runkle v. Pullin, 49 Ind. App. 619, 97 N.E. 956
(1912); Chevrier v. Robert, 6 Mont. 319, 12 Pac. 702 (1887); Meekison v. Groschner,
153 Ohio St. 301, 91 N.E.2d 680 (1950).
96. 152 Cal. 637, 93 Pac. 854 (1908).
97. McKee v. Dodd, supra note 96, at 642, 93 Pac. at 856.
98. 15 Idaho 167, 96 Pac. 932 (1908).
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example, in Curtis v. Armagast'9 all the parties were residents of New
York at the time allegedly fraudulent acts resulted in the transfer of
a deed from mother to son. All operative facts occurred in New York,
except for recordation of the deed in Iowa, where the land was located.
After the New York statute of limitations had fully barred all available relief in that state, plaintiff commenced a suit in Iowa, asking
the court to cancel the deed, expunge it from Iowa records, and
adjudge that she was the owner of an undivided interest in the land.
Although admitting that the cause of action had its primary contacts
with New York, and not Iowa, the court nevertheless held that the
action could arise only in Iowa, where the land was located, because
that was the only place where full and appropriate relief was available.100 Because of the peculiar fact situation, it was reasonable to
hold that plaintiff's remedy should not be barred because of failure to
enforce an inadequate remedy in a foreign jurisdiction.
c. MiscellaneousActions
The general rules which the courts have developed to determine
where a cause of action arises do not cover all possible situations.
Several miscellaneous factual patterns have necessitated application of
principles which do not fit precisely within these general rules.
Anticipatory Breach of Contract. In Balee v. Hidalgo County Water
Improvement Dist.1o1 a contract was executed in Texas for the purchase of municipal notes to be issued and delivered in Arkansas. After
plaintiff had made a down payment, defendant repudiated the contract in Texas prior to the performance date in Arkanses. The new
York court ruled that the cause of action arose in Texas, where defendant anticipatorily breached the contract, rather than in Arkansas,
0 2
where the contract was to be performed.1
Employment or Agency Contracts. When a contract of employment has been executed in one state and the employee is fired in
another, the employee's cause of action arises' 0 3 or originates'04 at
the place of firing rather than the place of hiring. An analogous
Mississippi case involved plaintiff's suspension from a labor union
99. 158 Iowa 507, 138 N.V. 873 (1912).
100. Accord, Folda Real Estate Co. v. Jacobsen, 75 Colo. 16, 223 Pac. 748

(1924).
101.

229 App. Div. 660, 242 N.Y. Supp. 676 (1st Dep't 1930).

102. Accord, Auglaize Box Board Co. v. Kansas City Fibre Box Co., 35 F.2d
822 (6th Cir. 1929).
103. Tandoc v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 857. 171 N.Y.S.2d
381, 382 (1st Dep't 1958).
104. Jenkins v. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1952).
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for alleged violations of the union's constitution.15 Although the
actual suspension took place in Kansas, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that plaintiff's cause of action "accrued" in Mississippi,
where the letter of suspension was received, plaintiff maintained his
membership in the union, and therefore, the wrong was completed.
Only two cases involving breach of an agency contract deal with
the applicability of a borrowing statute of limitations. In Vick v.
Parsons & Scoville Co. 30 6 plaintiff, who was engaged in the wholesale
grocery business in Indiana, hired defendant, a resident of Kentucky,
as his traveling salesman. When defendant failed to make a full accounting of profits received, the Indiana court held that plaintiff's
cause of action arose in Indiana, where accounts were to be settled,
rather than in the foreign jurisdiction, where wholesale contracts were
executed between defendant and customer. However, a contrary
conclusion was reached in Kamper v. Hunter Land C0.107 The defendant principal, incorporated in Minnesota, authorized plaintiff,
a resident of Iowa, to sell land located in Florida. The plaintiff
sued for his commission in a Minnesota court. The defendant contended that the action was barred because an appropriate Florida
prescriptive period had expired. The court held for defendant, stating that an agent's cause of action arises at the place in which he
exercised his authority if that place is other than the residence of his
principal.
Transportation Contracts. Actions arising from contracts of carriage, either for goods or for personal transportation, pose a special
problem because they may sound both in tort and contract. In Williams v. Illinois Cent. R.R.10s the plaintiff purchased a ticket in Missouri and was injured in Louisiana, where her train was derailed. The
Missouri court intimated that if plaintiff had elected to sue in tort,
the cause of action would have "originated" in Louisiana. Missouri's
borrowing statute was disregarded, however, because plaintiff alleged only a breach of contract; therefore, the action "originated" in
the forum where the ticket was purchased. A different conclusion was
reached under the Ohio borrowing statute, which calls for application of the law of the jurisdiction in which plaintiff's cause of action
"arose."' 0 9 In Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Reed"a0 plaintiff purchased a
105.

Lowry v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 220 F.2d 546

(5th Cir.

1955).
106. 75 Ind.App. 487, 130 N.E. 877 (1921).
107. 146 Minn. 337, 178 N.W. 747 (1920).
108. 360 Mo. 501, 229 S V.2d 1 (1950).
109. The Missouri courts borrow the law of the jurisdiction in which the
cause of action "originated," Mo. ANN. STAT. §516.180 (1949), and the Ohio courts
the law of the jurisdiction in which it "arose," OHio REv. CODE ANN. §2305.20
(Page 1954).
110. 223 Fed. 689 (6th Cir. 1915).
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ticket in Chicago and was injured in Indiana. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's cause of action "arose" in Indiana, where the breach of contract or infliction of tortious injury
occurred.
A similar analysis is appropriate in cases regarding loss or destruction of property in transit. If plaintiff's action is based upon the
specific act which resulted in loss or destruction, his cause of action
would originate or arise in the jurisdiction where the act occurred.
However, if plaintiff sues for failure to deliver, his cause of action
would originate or arise in the jurisdiction of the anticipated delivery.l'
Contracts of Indemnification. The Illinois and Indiana courts
have ruled that a cause of action based upon a promise of indemnification arises in the jurisdiction in which plaintiff paid defendant's
indebtedness.11 2 However, in Cohn v. Krauss1 3 the Ohio court held
that defendant's cross-action arose in Illinois, where various promises
of indemnification were made, and ignored the fact that defendant
discharged plaintiff's debt in Ohio.
Certificates of Deposit. In the only reported case involving a certificate of deposit, the Illinois court held that the plaintiff's cause of
action arose in the forum where demand was made and defendant was
subject to suit, not in Alaska, where defendant received the deposit
and executed the certificate.

14

EXTENT TO WHICH FOREIGN LAW WILL BE BORROWED

If the requirements of a given borrowing statute are satisfied, the
forum must determine the extent to which foreign law will operate
locally. Most courts categorically declare that the foreign period is or
is not to be applied, without asking the esoteric question - whose law
are we applying? The few courts which have raised this question have
consistently refused to acknowledge application of foreign law. Early
in the history of borrowing legislation, the Texas court announced
that its legislature certainly could not have "intended to give the
111. See, Merritt Creamery Co. v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 128 Mo. App. 420,
107 S.W. 462 (1908). There are apparently no cases in point in those states having
"arise" statutes. However, if plaintiff's action is based on defendant's specific act
of negligence, it is clear that the cause of action arose in the jurisdiction in which
damage occurred. If he sues for breach of contract, then, under the general rule,
the cause arose where the contract was to be performed - the place of delivery.
112. Orschel v. Rothschild, 238 Ill. App. 353 (1925); Runkle v. Pullin, 49 Ind.
App. 595, 97 N.E. 956 (1912).
113. 45 Ohio L. Abs. 148, 67 N.E.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1943).
114. Emerson v. North American Transp. & Trading Co., 303 111. 282, 135
N.E. 497 (1922).
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laws of a foreign country, propriovigore, any force or validity here." 115
The law of the forum is "all prevailing,"' 16 the foreign law "borrowed"
is not exclusive, 1 7 and foreign law is recognized only as an additional
prescriptive period available to defendant"l 8 if it is pleaded."19 A
Missouri court pointed out that its borrowing statute "does not make
the statute of limitations of a foreign state that to be applied in this
state, but makes that statute the statute of Missouri."" 20 The question
then arises as to how much of the foreign law becomes domestic law
by virtue of the forum's borrowing statute.
A majority of the courts begin with the basic proposition that the
borrowed prescriptive period is applied with all its accouterments, regardless of whether they be in the form of additional statutory provisions or interpretive judicial decisions. 12 Ohio is apparently the
only jurisdiction in which the courts borrow only one law - the specific foreign statutory period. 2' The Ohio position suggests the possibility of two reasonable interpretations of borrowing legislation, both
of which were perspicuously delineated by Judge Hand in Irving
Nat'l Bank v. Law.

23

A borrowing statute may mean that a defendant

sued in the forum should not be exposed to a longer period of limitation than that in the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose.
115. Hays v. Cage, 2 Tex. 501, 506 (1847).
116. Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Hilvert, 63 Ariz. 171, 180, 160 P.2d 331,
335 (1945).
117. Perry v. Robertson, 93 Kan. 703, 150 Pac. 223 (1915).
118. Bahn v. Fritz's Estate, 92 Mont. 84, 10 P.2d 1061 (1932); Isenberg v.
Rainier, 145 App. Div. 256, 130 N.Y. Supp. 27 (1st Dep't 1911).
119. Garrison v. Newman, 220 App. Div. 498, 227 N.Y. Supp. 78 (1st Dep't
1928), in which one cause of action arose in Brazil, the other in Philadelphia, and
both parties were non-residents of New York at all times involved. Defendant did
not plead the statute of limitations of either foreign jurisdiction, and the New
York court disregarded its borrowing statute.
120. Christner v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 228 Mo. App. 220, 223, 64 S.W.2d
752, 754 (1933). Accord, Alropa Corp. v. Smith, 240 Mo. App. 376, 199 S.W.2d
866 (1947).
121. E.g., American Surety Co. v. Gainfort, 219 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1955); Nolan
v. Transocean Air Lines, 173 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Holderness v. Hamilton
Fire Ins. Co., 54 F. Supp. 145 (S.D. Fla. 1944); Minniece v. Jeter, 65 Ala. 222 (1880).
When a foreign statute of limitations is borrowed, "it is not wrenched bodily out
of its own setting, but taken along with it are the court decisions of its own state
which interpret and apply it, and the companion statutes which limit and restrict
its operation. This we think is the general law." Devine v. Rook, 314 S.W.2d
932, 935 (Mo. App. 1958), 37 TEXAs L. REv. 911 (1959).
122. Wade v. Lynn, 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio 1960); Payne v. Kirchwehm,
141 Ohio 584, 48 N.E.2d 224 (1943); Bowers v. Holabird, 51 Ohio App. 417, 1
N.E.2d 326 (1935). See Palmieri v. Ahart, 111 Ohio App. 195, 167 N.E.2d 353
(1960), declaring that borrowing statutes have been "universally" construed not to
include the borrowing of foreign tolling provisions.
123. 9 F.2d 536, 537 (2d Cir. 1925), af'd on rehearing, 10 F.2d 721 (1926).
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On the other hand, the statute may mean that defendant should not
be suable in the forum if, at the time of suit, he could not be sued in
the state where the cause of action arose. If the former interpretation
is proper, only the foreign period should be borrowed; if the latter
is correct, all appropriate foreign tolling provisions should also
be borrowed.
Assume that plaintiff and defendant resided in State A when
plaintiff's cause of action arose, that the appropriate State A statute
of limitation requires litigation within ten years, and that State A has
a typical absent defendant tolling provision. Nine years after the
cause of action arose, defendant moved to the forum where plaintiff
eventually brought suit nine years later. Though a total period of
eighteen years has elapsed, the defendant had been present in State
A for only nine years. If the forum borrows only State A's ten year
period, plaintiff's action clearly will fail. However, plaintiff can still
maintain suit in State A because of its absent defendant statute; therefore, if the court considers this fact decisive, he may be allowed to sue
in the forum.
Most courts would conclude, in the case hypothesized, that plaintiff could maintain his action in the forum because all pertinent foreign law should be borrowed. However, this general rule is subject
to several refinements depending upon the particular "law" involved.
Whenever a defendant pleads stale demand, the court must select an
appropriate statutory period. If plaintiff's action is characterized as
one for breach of a sealed contract, the period may be twenty years;
but if the seal is disregarded, the period may be ten years. Once the
appropriate statutory period is selected, the court must determine
when it began running. Additional questions may arise as to whether
suit was commenced in time or whether the period has been tolled
or extended. Should these issues be resolved by applying foreign or
domestic law?
Which Foreign Statute of Limitations Is Applicable?
Most courts hold that a borrowing statute obligates the forum to
apply the law of the appropriate foreign jurisdiction to determine
which foreign statute of limitations is applicable. This rule was applied in all of the following instances. Is plaintiff's action one for
breach of an oral or a written contract?12- Is an action for malicious
garnishment governed by the foreign statute dealing with malicious
prosecution?1 23 If an action for malicious prosecution is not specifically
mentioned in the foreign jurisdiction's statutes of limitation, is its
124. Speich v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 178 Il1. App. 266 (1913); Jenkins v.
Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1952).
125.

Brown v. Westport Finance Co., 145 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
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general tort statute of limitation applicable?126 Is an action for per
diem demurrage governed by a foreign statute relating to penal
actions?127 Is a husband's suit for loss of his wife's services controlled
by the statute relating to property rights or by the statutory period
for personal injuries? 128 If a workmen's compensation insurance carrier sues to recover the amount paid to an injured employee, is the
carrier enforcing a property right or a right to maintain a derivative
action for personal injuries? 29 Is an action for malpractice governed
by a tort or a contract statute of limitations?"30 Will a contractual
period of limitation control rather than the appropriate statutory
period? 31 In all of these cases the forum applied the foreign prescriptive period which the foreign court would have applied.
The Ohio courts, however, hold that the selection of the appropriate limitation statute is made according to domestic law, although
the choice is between two foreign statutory periods. This rule may
be illustrated by a comparison of three cases arising from the Florida
land boom involving the same issue - whose law determines which
statute of limitations is applicable in an action alleging breach of a
sealed contract? In Alropa Corp. v. Rossee, 32 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held first, that the forum's statute of limitations governed
as a part of its procedural law, and second, that the "Georgia definition
of a sealed instrument is a part of its limitation statute" and is applicable as an additional "procedural" rule.2

3

Georgia has no borrowing

126. Jenkins v. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1952).
127. Frizell Grain & Supply Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 201 S.W. 78, 79
(1918). See also Skouras Theatres Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 179 F.
Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
128. Heinzelman v. Union News Co., 275 App. Div. 931, 300 N.Y. 444, 92
N.E.2d 37 (1st Dep't 1950); Palmieri v. Ahart, 111 Ohio App. 489, 167 N.E.2d 353

(1960).
129. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 102 F. Supp.
451 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
130. Lindsay v. Woodward, 5 Utah 2d 183, 299 P.2d 619 (1956).
131. In Holderness v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 54 F. Supp. 145 (S.D. Fla. 1944),
plaintiff sued under a North Carolina fire insurance policy which contained a contractual one year period of limitation. Such a limitation is void in Florida, but it
was enforced by the federal district court in Florida because, first, the Florida borrowing statute requires that all foreign laws be borrowed, and second, the contractual limitation must be recognized as a matter of federal constitutional law.
Contra, Asel v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 355 Mo. 658,
197 S.W.2d 639 (1946). The decision of the Supreme Court in Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), would seem to be controlling in most cases involving
this issue.
132. 86 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1936).
133. Alropa Corp. v. Rossee, supra note 132, at 119. See Gaffe v. Williams, 68
Ga. App. 299, 22 S.E.2d 765 (1942), for a Georgia state court decision applying
these rules.
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statute, and both holdings in the Rossee case are supported by precedent from other jurisdictions having no borrowing legislation. 134 Ohio
does have such a statute, but in Alropa Corp. v. Kirchwehm"35 the
Ohio Supreme Court adopted the same rule which was applied in the
Rossee case to determine which law controls the effect of a seal for
limitations purposes. According to the Ohio statute, the "laws" of the
foreign jurisdiction in which the cause of action arose are operative
to bar a "like cause of action" in the forum.136 Construing this statute,
the Ohio court concluded that if a seal is relevant only in regard to
the issue of limitations, a question of procedure is involved and
the forum must determine the procedural effect of a seal. Since the
domestic limitation statute concerning "specialties" did not apply to
contracts bearing a "private" seal, the Florida prescriptive period for
unsealed contracts was borrowed.13 The end result of the Kirchwehm
case was to bar an action which would not otherwise have been barred
by either the Ohio or Florida statutes of limitation.38 The Ohio
statute barred actions on written contracts after the expiration of
fifteen years, and since suit was commenced within approximately
seven years, plaintiff could have recovered in Ohio had his cause of
action arisen in that state. If he had sued in Florida, where his cause
of action did in fact arise, the Florida court would have applied its
twenty-year period for sealed contracts and recovery would have been
permitted. However, since suit was commenced in Ohio, and the
forum's characterization resulted in application of a Florida prescriptive period which would not have been appropriate in that state,
plaintiff was denied the right to enforce his cause of action. In Alropa
Corp. v. Smith"39 a Missouri court refused to reach such an anomalous
conclusion. The court properly held that the law of Florida, not that
of Missouri, should determine which Florida statute of limitations
was applicable. Both the Ohio and Missouri borrowing statutes require that the "laws" of an appropriate foreign jurisdiction be applied,
but only the Missouri court concluded that laws means laws. 140

134. Burns Mortgage Co. v. Hardy, 94 F.2d 477, 480-81 (1st Cir. 1938); Mandru
v. Ashby, 108 Md. 693, 71 At. 312 (1908); Coral Gables, Inc. v. Christopher, 108
Vt. 414, 189 At. 147 (1937). See generally, Bank of the U.S. v. Donnally, 33 U.S.
(8 Pet.) 361 (1834).
135. 138 Ohio St. 30, 33 N.E.2d 655, appeal dismissed, 313 U.S. 549 (1941).
136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2305.20 (Page 1954).
137. Alropa Corp. v. Kirshwehm, supra note 135.
138. See, Nordstrom, Ohio's Borrowing Statute of Limitations-A Quaking
Quagmire in a Dismal Swamp, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 183, 194 (1955); Note, 36 ILL. L.
REV. 468 (1941).

139.
140.
1954).

199 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App. 1947).
See Mo. ANN. STAT. §516.180 (1949); OIo
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Whose Law Determines When the Foreign PrescriptivePeriod Began
to Run?
Once the forum has selected the appropriate foreign statutory
period, it must determine when that period began to run. The few
cases in point conclude that foreign law should be borrowed, and
this conclusion has been reached without discussion as to whether a
"procedural" or a "substantive" rule is involved. 141
Whose Law Determines Whether Action Was Commenced Before
the Foreign Statutory Period Expired? In resolving this issue, several
courts have reverted to the common law dichotomy between substantive and procedural rules instead of seeking a solution which is consistent with the terms and intent of borrowing legislation. In those
cases holding that local rules are applicable, the courts have argued
that "the question is purely one of remedy and procedure governed
by the law of the forum."' 142 However, those courts applying foreign
law look only to the forum's borrowing statute and are not troubled
by the question of whether they are applying a procedural or a substantive rule. 43 The primary area of dispute involves application of
"journey's account" statutes, 4 4 which give plaintiff additional time to
141. Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (Ist Cir. 1955); In re
Superior's Estate, 211 Minn. 108, 300 N.W. 393 (1941) (involving the question of
when the statute of limitations began to run against a cause of action for personal services- as the services were rendered, or when the alleged employer died);
Klemme v. Long, 184 Minn. 97, 237 N.W. 882 (1931) (in which the forum applied
Iowa law to determine whether a cause of action for fraud became subject to
limitations when the fraud was perpetrated, or not until it was discovered);
Thompson v. Lyons, 281 Mo. 430, 220 S.W. 942 (1920); Shannon v. Shannon, 193
Ore. 575, 238 P.2d 744 (1951) (semble).
142. Collins v. Manville, 170 Ill. 614, 617, 48 N.E. 914, 915 (1897). Accord,
Knight v. Moline E.M. & W. Ry., 160 Iowa 160, 140 N.W. 839 (1913), in which the
Iowa court held that an amendment, allowed after the Illinois prescriptive period
had elapsed, related back as a matter of Iowa law to the time plaintiff's complaint
was filed, which was before the Illinois period had fully run. See also Slater v.
Roche, 148 Iowa 413, 126 N.W. 925 (1910); Drummy v. Oxman, 280 App. Div. 800,
113 N.Y.S.2d 224 (2d Dep't 1952).
143. E.g.,Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Stanley v. Bird 85
F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Ky. 1949); Casner v. San Diego Trust & Say. Bank, 34 Cal.
App. 2d 524, 94 P.2d 65 (1939). In Gibson v. Womack, 218 Ky. App. 626, 291 S.W.
1021 (1927), plaintiff's action was commenced either on the last possible day under
the West Virginia statute of limitations or one day late, depending upon whether
the Kentucky or West Virginia method of computation was to be used. The West
Virginia method was applied.
144. Historically, a "journey's account" was a period "allowed to permit a
party, whose action had abated for matter of form, a reasonable time within which
to journey to court to sue out a new writ." Baker v. Cohn, 266 App. Div. 236, 239,
41 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (Ist Dep't 1943). Modernly, the purpose of such statutes is
to permit a diligent plaintiff to continue his action if dismissed without fault
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sue if a timely suit is dismissed through no fault of his own. In
Fowler v. Herman1 5 plaintiff was injured in Alabama and filed suit
in Tennessee within the one-year Alabama period. The defendant
could not be served in Tennessee, and a voluntary nonsuit was entered.
After one year had elapsed, but within the extension period granted
by the Tennessee tolling provision, defendant was found in the
forum and a new suit was filed. The plaintiff was permitted to recover
notwithstanding the lapse of one year, because under the Tennessee
statute his action was commenced when the first complaint was filed.146
In a case involving essentially the same facts, a federal court in Pennsylvania also held that suit was timely, but reached this conclusion on
the basis of Delaware's journey's account statute rather than the law
of the forum.147 The Pennsylvania decision was properly based on an
interpretation of the local borrowing statute, the purpose of which
is "simply to insure that a plaintiff who sues in Pennsylvania obtains
thereby no greater rights than those given in the state where his cause
of action arose ....148
Whose Law Determines Whether the Foreign Period Has Been
Tolled or Extended? The courts have consistently held that the
forum should look to the law of the appropriate foreign jurisdiction
to determine whether the borrowed statutory period has been tolled
or extended by reason of part payment, 1"9 acknowledgment of a
debt,5 0 death of the debtor,' 5' notice given to a tort-feasor,52 or infancy of the plaintiff.' 5 3 With the exception of Ohio, s5 the courts
on his part, when the prescriptive period expired while the initial action was

pending.
145.

292 S.W.2d 11 (Tenn. 1956).

146. The Missouri courts also apply the rule illustrated by the Fowlel case.
Wright v. N.Y. Underwriters' Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp. 663 (W.D. Mo. 1932); Turner '.
Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 346 Mo. 28, 142 S.W.2d 455 (1940).

147. Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
148. Id. at 704. Accord, Momand v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., 172
F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948); Stanley v. Bird, 85 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Ky. 1949); Fulkerson v. American Chain & Cable Co. Inc., 72 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
149. E.g., King v. Fay, 169 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C 1958); Casner v. San Diego
Trust & Say. Bank, 34 Cal. App. 2d 524, 94 P.2d 65 (1939); Theis v. Wood, 238
Mo. 643, 142 S.W. 431 (1911) (holding that plaintiff's action was barred since attempted part payment in Kansas did not toll limitations according to Kansas law,
although it would have according to the law of the forum); Butler v. Merchants
Nat'l Bank, 325 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (semble).
150. Glenn v. McDavid, 316 Ill. App. 130, 44 N.E.2d 84 (1942).

151. Ibid.
152. Burkhardt %.Northern States Power Co., 180 Minn. 560, 231 N.W. 239
(1930).
153.

Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1960); Hilliard v.

Pennsylvania R.R., 73 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1934); Moore v. Roschen, 93 F. Supp. 993
(S.D.N.Y. 1950); Handlin v. Burchett, 270 Mo. 114, 192 S.W. 1016 (1917).

154. Wade v. Lynn, 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio 1960); Payne v. Kirchwehn,
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have also looked to the law of the jurisdiction in which the cause
of action arose to determine whether defendant's absence from that
state should operate to toll the running of the borrowed period. In
some cases defendant's absence from the foreign state having primary
contact with plaintiff's cause of action did not operate to toll the
borrowed period, either because the state referred to had no absent
defendant statute 55 or because defendant's absence was insufficient
under the borrowed law.156 In other cases defendant's absence from
the jurisdiction in which the cause of action arose was sufficient under
the borrowed law to toll the appropriate prescriptive period.15 7 For
example, in Colello v. Sundquist5 s a federal court in New York
borrowed the Connecticut statute of limitations. Because of defendant's residence in New York, it was necessary to determine what
effect his absence from Connecticut might have on the running of
the borrowed Connecticut statute. This issue was resolved by applying
the Connecticut rule that absence does not toll a prescriptive period
if service of process is available according to the provisions of the Connecticut non-resident motorist statute. Judgment was accordingly
granted in favor of the defendant. In Hill v. Schantz,159 involving
essentially the same factual pattern, the court again looked to the
law of a sister state, but judgment was granted for plaintiff because
absence did toll the New Jersey statute of limitations, even though
service of process was available under the New Jersey non-resident
motorist statute. Thus, regardless of whether the foreign absent
defendant statute would or would not interrupt the running of the
borrowed period, the courts have applied the foreign law.
Ohio is the only state specifically holding that a foreign limitation
period is borrowed without its supplemental tolling provision relating
to defendant's absence.1 60 This conclusion is difficult to rationalize
from the face of the Ohio borrowing statute, which states only that
141 Ohio 384, 48 N.E.2d 224 (1943); Palmieri v. Ahart, 111 Ohio App. 195, 167
N.E.2d 353 (1960).
155. First Nat'l Bank v. Hurlburt, 224 Ill. App. 297 (1922). In Timmonds v.
Messner, 109 Kan. 518, 200 Pac. 270 (1921), the forum held that plaintiff's action
was barred by the Colorado statute of limitations due to lack of any absent defendant statute in Colorado; the court indicated that this result should be reached,
even though absence would toll the domestic period.
156. Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 140 F. Supp. 909 (E.D.N.Y.
1956); McGrath v. Helena Rubinstein, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
157. E.g., American Surety Co. v. Gainfort, 219 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1955); Holderness v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 54 F. Supp. 145 (S.D. Fla. 1944); Chaloupka v. Martin, 179 Iowa 1173, 162 N.W. 567 (1917).
158. 137 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
159. 10 App. Div. 2d 628, 196 N.Y.S.2d 356 (2d Dep't 1960).
160. E.g., Hilliard v. Pennsylvania R.R., 73 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1934); Wade
v. Lynn, 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio 1960); Palmieri v. Ahart, Ill Ohio App. 195,
167 N.E.2d 353 (1960).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1962

31

FLORIDA
LAW
REVIE,
UNIVERSITY
Florida Law OF
Review,
Vol. 15, Iss.
1 [1962],
Art.l'J3

plaintiff's cause of action shall be barred in Ohio "if the laws of any
state . . . where a cause of action arose limit the time for the commencement of the action to a lesser number of years than do the
statutes of this state in like causes of action .. .. "1,61 The words time
and lesser number of years seem to suggest that only the foreign period
is to be borrowed. But if State X also has an absent defendant tolling
provision, the number of years provided for by the appropriate statute
of limitations in State X is necessarily affected by defendant's absence
from that state. Thus it appears that the Ohio borrowing statute calls
for a computation of the foreign limitation period as affected by the
tolling provision.
The justification given for disregarding foreign absent defendant
provisions is based on the idea that only one prescriptive period can
be applied. "The statute of limitations is not a will-o'-the-wisp that
can fly from one state to another as fancy dictates."' 62 The forum is
to apply either the Ohio limitation period or that of the sister state
involved. If the foreign period is to be applied, it then becomes the
6 3
Ohio period. From this it is argued: r
"It would indeed be an anomalous bit of logic to hold that
although the defendant has been in Ohio and therefore subject
to an action by the plaintiff in this forum, nevertheless the
statute of limitation has been prevented from running against
the plaintiff in Ohio for no other reason than that the defendant has been absent from Florida."
Basically, this problem arises from the necessity of making a choice
between two conflicting policy considerations. On the one hand, it
would seem that a plaintiff's action should not be barred by the prescriptive period of a state in which defendant was not subject to suit
for the entire statutory period. Why should plaintiff's action be barred
by a ten-year period of limitation borrowed from State X if defendant
could not have been sued in that state during the last three years of
the ten-year period? On the other hand, why should defendant be
subject to suit in the forum if plaintiff has had ample time to litigate
in the forum, or in a foreign jurisdiction, but has failed to do so?
Suppose defendant has resided in three different states and the appropriate statute of limitations is ten years in each. If he has resided in
161. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §2305.20 (Page 1954). (Emphasis added.)
162. Bowers v. Holabird, 51 Ohio App. 413, 416, 1 N.E.2d 326, 328 (1935).
163. Payne v. Kirchwehm, 141 Ohio St. 384, 387, 48 N.E.2d 224, 226 (1943).
Judge Bell, dissenting, argued that "it was not the purpose or intent of the General
Assembly to make [our borrowing statute] . . . the vehicle for borrowing a
statute of limitation of another state to bar an action in Ohio unless such borrowed statute would also bar the action if prosecuted in that state." 141 Ohio St.
at 396, 48 N.E.2d at 229.
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each state for nine years and foreign absent defendant tolling provisions are borrowed by the forum, plaintiff's suit is timely although
a total period of twenty-seven years has elapsed. Defendant has migrated from the jurisdiction in which the cause of action arose, but is
there any hardship to plaintiff in requiring him to sue within ten
years regardless of where defendant is amenable to suit? Is the
judicial process so sterile that plaintiff cannot adequately present
his claim in a jurisdiction other than that in which it arose and do
so within a reasonable time? It must be conceded that the Ohio rule
encourages prompt litigation and does not extend the period of defendant's judicial liability merely because he failed to remain in one
jurisdiction for its full prescriptive period.
Borrowinga Longer Periodof Limitation
Although a cause of action has all its initial contacts with a sister
state, the forum may apply its own prescriptive period, which normally
begins to run when defendant first becomes amenable to the jurisdiction of its courts.6 4 Two questions may arise. If the forum has
a borrowing statute, will a borrowed foreign period apply to the exclusion of the domestic period? If defendant may plead either the
local or the foreign period, should plaintiff's action be dismissed if
it is barred by local law but is timely according to the more liberal
foreign law? The courts seem to resolve these problems by asking
whether borrowing legislation is intended to "enlarge" the forum's
own limitation period. 65 But is this approach proper? The basic
inquiry would seem to be whether borrowing legislation has reversed
the common law rule that statutes of limitation are merely procedural
matters, governed by domestic law. In view of the enactment of
borrowing statutes calling for application of a foreign prescriptive
period, are statutes of limitation now to be characterized as "substantive"? Or are statutes of limitation still regarded as "procedural,"
164. In Millar v. Hilton, 189 Mich. 635, 155 N.W. 574 (1915), arising in one
of the jurisdictions not having a borrowing statute, the court held that defendant
could not tack his period of residence in a foreign jurisdiction onto his period
of residence in the forum. In Perry v. Robertson, 96 Kan. 83, 150 Pac. 223 (1915),
the court simply stated that its own statute of limitations began to run when
defendant came into the state. Plummer v. Lowenthal, 165 N.Y. Supp. 220 (Sup.
Ct., Att. T. 1917), held that the New York absent defendant tolling provision
operated to prevent the forum's period from running until defendant entered New
York. All three cases reached the same conclusion, but the reasoning was slightly
different in each.
165. E.g., Gaier & Stroh Millinery Co. v. Hilliker, 52 Okla. 74, 152 Pac. 410
(1915); Newell v. Harrison Eng'r & Constr. Corp., 149 Kan. 838, 840, 89 P.2d 869
(1939) (dictum).
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thus necessitating application of domestic limitations unless borrowing legislation has created an exception? If the former interpretation
is correct and the forum's borrowing statute is applicable, it follows
that the "substantive" limitation rules of the foreign jurisdiction
should be applied to the exclusion of local rules -regardless of
whether the foreign period is longer than the appropriate domestic
period. If the latter interpretation is correct, the foreign "procedural"
rule might be applied, but not necessarily to the exclusion of the
domestic limitation period.
Only six states have legislation clearly indicating that foreign law
is not to be borrowed if it provides for a prescriptive period longer
than that of the forum.oe With or without such legislation, the prevailing rule calls for application of a foreign limitation period only
if it is shorter than the domestic period.17 If the forum's period has
expired, plaintiff's action is barred even though it is not barred by the
law of the jurisdiction in which the cause of action had its initial
contact. 6 The only deviation from this rule is found in Kentucky,
where plaintiff's action has been held timely if prosecuted within
the foreign period, although the Kentucky period has already expired. 16 9 However, neither the Kentucky cases nor those applying the
prevailing rule have discussed the effect of borrowing legislation on
the characterization of statutes of limitation as either substantive or
procedural. Should such legislation evoke a substantive characterization? It might be argued that statutes of limitation should be characterized as substantive, particularly in a jurisdiction calling for application of a foreign period by way of its borrowing statute. However,
one reason for enactment of borrowing legislation is to encourage
166. The following three statutes specifically permit the forum to borrow only
a shorter foreign period: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §8120 (1953); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§413.320 (1955); OHo REv. CODE ANN. §2305.20 (Page 1954). The other three

statutes in this group provide only that an action may be barred by either the
law of the forum or of the appropriate foreign jurisdiction. By necessary implication, the shorter of the two periods is to be applied. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §13;
VA. CODE ANN. §8-23 (1957); W. VA. CODE ANN. §5409 (1955).
167. E.g., Bonsant v. Rugo, 190 F. Supp. 958 (D. Mass. 1961); Pack v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 50 Del. 413, 132 A.2d 54 (1957); Gaffney v. Unit Crane & Shovel
Corp., 49 Del. 395, 117 A.2d 237 (1955); Brown v. Case, 80 Fla. 703, 86 So. 684
(1920).
168. E.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Parish, 168 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1947);
Brown v. Case, supra note 167; Farthing v. Sams, 296 Mo. 442, 247 S.W. Ill
(1922); Kahn v. Commercial Union of America, Inc., 227 App. Div. 82, 237 N.Y.
Supp. 94 (1st Dep't 1929).
169. See Ley v. Simmons, 249 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1952); Smith -. Baltimore &
0. R.R., 157 Ky. 113, 162 S.W. 564 (1914); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Burkhart, 154
Ky. 92, 157 S.W. 18 (1913); John Shillito Co. v. Richardson, 102 Ky. 51, 42 S.W.
847 (1897). See also Koeppe v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 250 F.2d 270 (6th Cir.

1957).
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timely litigation, even in cases where defendant meanders from state
to state. If the courts are to effectuate this policy, the forum should be
permitted to bar plaintiff's action by its own prescriptive period, if
properly applicable, although this might entail non-recognition of
the issue as to whether statutes of limitation are substantive or procedural when a borrowing statute is to be applied.
PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION PECULIAR TO SPECIFIC

GROUPS OF BORROWING STATUTES

Maximum Periodsfor Enforcement of ForeignActions
Few legislative attempts have been made to prescribe a maximum
period of time within which a foreign cause of action must be litigated in the forum.170 In the normal case where defendant does not
continually shift his residence from one state to another, perhaps such
a maximum period is unnecessary. Assume that the period of limitation is ten years in both the forum and State A, where defendant's
liability arose. If defendant lived in State A for eight years before
moving to the forum, where he resided for ten years, plaintiff's action
is barred in the forum. Since the forum's own prescriptive period
begins to run when defendant first becomes a resident, domestic
limitation rules do, in a sense, operate as a maximum period within
which foreign causes of action must be litigated. The "maximum"
period would be eighteen years. Suppose, however, that defendant
resided for eight years in State A, twelve years in State B, and ten
years in the forum. If the forum refuses to borrow the prescriptive
period of State B, but does borrow the statute of limitations of State
A and its absent defendant tolling provision, the maximum period
in the forum would be thirty years. To prevent such a case from
arising, one of two solutions might be adopted. First, the forum could
borrow only State A's prescriptive period and disregard its absent
defendant statute. Thus, the maximum period of limitation in the
forum would be ten years. Second, the forum could apply the prevailing rule, which calls for application of State A's absent defendant
statute, but establish a maximum number of years for enforcement of
foreign causes of action. The Colorado legislation, on its face, appears
170. In Connecticut, one of the states having no borrowing statute, a specific
maximum period for enforcement of foreign actions has been established by the
Connecticut absent defendant tolling provision. According to CONN. GEN. STAT.
Rv. §52-590 (Supp. 1959), the time during which defendant is outside the state is
to be excluded from the computation of the approximate limitation period, but
the time so excluded is not to exceed seven years. In jurisdictions having borrowing statutes, COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN §87-1-22 (1953), HAWAII REv. LAWS §241-6
(1955), and Wyo. STAT. ANN. §1-16 (1957) specifically provide for a maximum
period in regard to enforcement of foreign actions.
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to adopt the latter solution. Section 87-1-22 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes Annotated of 1953, which immediately follows Colorado's
borrowing statute, reads as follows:
"It shall be lawful for any person against whom an action shall
be commenced in any court of this state, wherein the cause of
action accrued without this state . . .more than six years before the commencement of the action in this state, to plead
the same in bar of the action in this state ...."
In Kelly v. Heller171 the Colorado court interpreted section 22 literally,
holding that causes of action accruing in other states are barred if
more than six years has elapsed since the date of accrual. However,
in Simon v. Wilnes 72 the court overruled Kelly v. Heller by holding
that plaintiff's action must be "fully barred" by the law of the jurisdiction in which it accrued and six additional years must have elapsed.
Since the court was convinced that section 22 should not be read
literally, it might have held that the maximum period for enforcement in the forum is to be computed by adding six years to the number of years provided for by the appropriate foreign limitation statute.
In either of the hypothetical cases suggested at the beginning of this
section, such an interpretation would require suit within sixteen years.
The court held, however, that plaintiff's action must be fully barred
under the foreign law, which would necessarily invoke reference to
foreign absent defendant tolling provisions. In both hypotheticals,
plaintiff's action would not be "fully barred" in State A because of
defendant's absence from that state following his eight years of residence. Thus, under Simon v. Wilnes plaintiff's action would not be
barred until defendant had resided in Colorado for the full domestic
period. In the first hypothetical, plaintiff could sue at any time
within a total period of eighteen years; in the second, his action would
not be barred for thirty years. There has been no reduction of the
period for enforcement of foreign actions, although section 22 was
enacted for this purpose.
Another incongruity appears when Simon v. Wilnes is compared
with Colorado's borrowing statute. 173 Even though plaintiff's action
is fully barred by foreign law, the majority in Simon v. Wilnes held
that it is not barred in Colorado for an additional six years. The
concurring opinion correctly suggested that the borrowing statute

171.

74 Colo. 470, 222 Pac. 648 (1924).

172.

97 Colo. 78, 47 P.2d 406 (1935).

173. "When a cause of action arises in another state . . . and by the laws
thereof an action thereon cannot be maintained against a person by reason of the
lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against him in this state."
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §87-1-21 (1953).
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and section 22 should be construed together,17 4 but the dissenting
opinion properly added that they should be made to harmonize, and
not to impose an additional six-year period after the action has been
fully barred by foreign law.
The Colorado experience illustrates the difficulty which courts
might have when legislatures attempt to establish specific maximum
periods for enforcement of foreign causes of action. Perhaps a slight
modification of section 22, combined with the Ohio rule that absent
defendant tolling provisions are not to be borrowed, would produce
the result intended by the Colorado legislature.175 If, for instance,
the Colorado court had held that only the foreign period is to be borrowed, but an additional six years is to be added to that period,
plaintiffs would be given a reasonable time within which to sue, and
the period of defendant's judicial responsibility would not be unduly
extended merely because he failed to stay put.
Residence Requirements
All but eight borrowing statutes contain express requirements
relating to the residence of either plaintiff or defendant.176 Even in
the absence of statutory language concerning residence, this factor
has been considered to be of some significance. For example, the
Illinois borrowing statute imposes no residence requirements, but the
courts of that state have held that foreign limitations are not to be
borrowed unless both plaintiff and defendant were non-residents when
77
the cause of action aroseY.
By liberally interpreting the statutory requirement calling for application of the laws of the state in which
plaintiff's action "arose," the Illinois courts have also held that plaintiff's action is barred by the laws of a jurisdiction in which defendant
has resided, although he was not a resident of that state when his
obligation matured or became due.

78

Exceptions FavoringResident or Citizen Plaintiffs. At least twelve
states have borrowing statutes which expressly or impliedly create an
exception favoring a resident or citizen plaintiff.y 9 The California
174. Simon v. Wilnes, 97 Colo. 78, 84, 47 P.2d 406, 409 (1935).
175. Notwithstanding "vigorous attack" by defendant's counsel, Simon v.
Wilnes has been accepted, with little discussion, as the law of Colorado. Newton v.
Mann, 111 Colo. 76, 137 P.2d 776 (1943).
176. See Appendix A.
177. E.g., Orschel v. Rothschild, 238 Ill. App. 353 (1925); Chicago Mill &
Lumber Co. v. Townsend, 203 IIl. App. 457 (1916); Delta Bag Co. v. Frederick
Leyland &Co., 173 Ill. App. 38 (1912).
178. See cases cited in Notes 87-89 supra.
179. See Appendix A. Those statutes specifically requiring that both plaintiff and defendant be non-residents might also operate to the advantage of a
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statute is typical. An action barred by the laws of the jurisdiction in
which it arose cannot be maintained in California "except in favor
of one who has been a citizen of this state, and who has held the cause
of action from the time it accrued."180 Under such statutes, plaintiff's
residence or citizenship in the forum precludes a plea of foreign
limitations, even though the period of an appropriate foreign state
has fully run.181 Since defendant may rely only on the forum's prescriptive periods, it is immaterial that he has resided for thirty or
forty years in the state where plaintiff first became entitled to sue.
Moreover, if defendant is not a resident of the forum, he may not
plead the domestic period. Even if he should become a resident, the
forum will apply its absent defendant statute and will subtract from
its computation the period of defendant's non-residence.18 2 On the
other hand, plaintiff's residence or citizenship in the forum is immaterial in those states having no residence exception in their borrowing statutes, 3 and action may be barred by appropriate foreign
law, although it would not have been barred had the action initially
had its contacts with the

8

forum.1

4

Merely to state the problem involved raises doubts as to the constitutionality of such resident or citizen exceptions. In one jurisdiction having a resident plaintiff exception, the state court held the provision constitutional simply because it did not abridge the privileges
and immunities secured to the citizens of the several states. 185 However, the United States Supreme Court has unanimously declared
that Minnesota's citizen plaintiff exception is constitutional.186 After
expressing reluctance to declare unconstitutional a statute that had
resident plaintiff. E.g., Fenton v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 283 P.2d 799 (Okla. 1955).
180. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §361.

181.

E.g., Stewart v. Spaulding, 12 Cal. 264, 13 Pac. 661 (1887). However, such

plaintiff exceptions do not operate to prevent a non-resident

defendant from

pleading a foreign "built-in" statute of limitation. Pack v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
50 Del. 413, 132 A.2d 54 (1957).

182. E.g., Laurencelle v. Laurencelle, 217 App. Div. 159, 216 N.Y. Supp. 384
(2d Dep't 1926).

183. E.g., Auglaize Box Board Co. v. Kansas City Fibre Box Co., 35 F.2d 822
(6th Cir. 1929); Kellum v. Robinson, 193 Iowa 1277, 188 NA. 821 (1922); McCoy
v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 134 Mo. App. 622, 114 S.W. 1124 (1909). In each of these
cases plaintiff was a resident of the forum, but this fact was merely mentioned in
passing or given no particular weight.
184.
185.

Hunter v. Niagra Fire Ins. Co., 73 Ohio St. 110, 76 N.E. 563 (1905).
Klotz v. Angle, 220 N.Y. 347, 116 N.E. 24 (1917).

186. Canadian No. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920). Apparently overlooking
the Eggen case, the Colorado court, by way of dictum, intimated that its citizenplaintiff exception might be unconstitutional. Folda Real Estate Co. v. Jacobsen,
75 Colo. 16, 18, 223 Pac. 748 (1924). Although the reason for its deletion is not
clear, the Colorado borrowing statute no longer has such an exception. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §87-1-21 (1953).
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been in force for some sixty years, the Court made this statement:' 8 7
"[T]he constitutional requirement is satisfied if the non-resident is given access to the courts of the State upon terms which
in themselves are reasonable and adequate for the enforcing
of any rights he may have, even though they may not be technically and precisely the same in extent as those accorded to
resident citizens .... A man cannot be said to be denied, in

a constitutional or in any rational sense, the privilege of resorting to courts to enforce his rights when he is given free access
to them for a length of time reasonably sufficient to enable
an ordinarily diligent man to institute proceedings for their
protection."
In response to the argument that the Minnesota legislature dearly
discriminated in favor of its own citizens, the Court stated that "the
discrimination of which he [plaintiff] complains could arise only from
his own neglect."'' s If a non-resident plaintiff is given a reasonable
time within which to litigate in the forum, it is constitutionally immaterial that a citizen plaintiff involved in a similar factual situation
might be entitled to sue regardless of how many years had elapsed. 8 9
The chauvinistic attitude reflected by such plaintiff exceptions is,
in fact, directly opposed to one of the basic ideas which prompted
enactment of borrowing statutes: to provide a reasonable time for
plaintiffs to prosecute their actions against ambulatory defendants,
but at the same time prevent the possibility of perpetual judicial
liability against a defendant who shifted his place of abode but remained amenable to suit in a foreign jurisdiction for its full precriptive period. Rather than restricting a wandering defendant's
liability to a reasonable time, such exceptions may operate to expose
him to liability in the forum which is unlimited in duration.
Perhaps the legislators enacting the statutes involved felt that
resident plaintiff exceptions would encourage immigration. However,
non-resident plaintiffs are given no real incentive to move, because
the exceptions apply only in favor of plaintiffs who were residents or
citizens when their causes of action first arose. 9 0 Few potential plaintiffs would move to a state merely because the potential defendant's
187. Canadian No. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 562 (1920).
188. Id. at 561.
189. In Rieser v. Baltimore 9= 0. R.R., 123 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1954),
several plaintiffs were involved, some being New York residents, and others nonresidents. In regard to the non-resident plaintiffs, defendant could plead both
the foreign and the domestic period of limitation. Against the New York plaintiffs, defendant could plead only the domestic period. Thus, in a single case,
some plaintiffs were in a slightly more favorable position than others simply because they happened to be New York residents.
190. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §361. In Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 Pac.
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liability might be perpetual if he could be sued in that state. And
even though a defendant might realize that plaintiff's action will not
be barred in State X, where plaintiff is a resident, unless he starts
the prescriptive period running by becoming a resident of that jurisdiction, how many defendants would move for that reason-particularly if it is doubtful whether the courts of plaintiff's residence
will ever acquire jurisdiction? Since any incentive to immigrate is
probably non-existent, the only reasons for such exceptions are to
discriminate in favor of resident plaintiffs and eliminate the inconvenience of bringing timely suit in another state. The application of a borrowing statute, which would otherwise call for local application of some "foreign" law, is thereby narrowed in favor of a
resident plaintiff. No principle of law or logic can support such a rule.
Defendant's Residence at Time of Suit. According to four borrowing statutes, the defendant must be a resident of the forum when
suit is commenced.191 The Texas statute is most explicit: "No action
shall be brought against an immigrant to recover a claim which was
barred by the law of limitation of the State or country from which he
emigrated .... "192 In addition to these four statutes, several enactments call for application of the law of the jurisdiction in which
defendant has "resided" or in which he has "previously resided."' 19 3
However, such statutes have not been construed to mean that defendant must reside in the forum when suit is commenced.' 94 For
example, plaintiff's action might be barred by the law of the state
in which defendant has "previously resided," although defendant
has never been a resident of the forum.1915 Therefore, it seems that
unambiguous statutory language is necessary before the forum will
permit defendant to plead foreign law only, if he has migrated to the
forum.
The manner in which these four statutes are applied and the rationale which prompted enactment are obvious. If defendant is not
a resident of the forum when suit is commenced, he may rely only on
the domestic period of limitations; the bar created by the law of
520 (1908), plaintiff was a resident of the forum. However, the Utah citizen plaintiff exception, now found in UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-45 (1953), was not applied
because plaintiff was an assignee of the cause of action and had not held it "from
the time it accrued."
191. ARIZ. REV. S-ris. ANN. §12-506(A) (1956); LA. Cir. CODE ANN. art. 3532
(West 1952); MIss. CODE ANN. §741 (1942); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5542

(1958).
192.
193.
194.
Iowa 93
195.

Tax REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5542 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
See Appendix A, §C.
E.g., Van Dorn v. Bodley, 38 Ind. 402 (1871); Lebrecht v. Wilcoxon, 40
(1874).
Lebrecht v. Wilcoxon, 40 Iowa 93 (1874).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss1/3

40

Ester: Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws
BORROWING STATUTES
another state is immaterial. 19 6 It is argued that such a result encourages immigration. 19 But should a rule of law be adopted for
the sole purpose of encouraging immigration? If plaintiff's action is
fully barred by the law of some appropriate sister state, should it
nevertheless be "timely" merely because defendant is not presently a
resident of the forum? Defendant's immunity to the judgment of a
court of law should not be treated so lightly, and borrowing statutes
should not be manipulated by legislatures as pots of gold for the
enticement of foreigners. No conflict of laws principle calls for application of foreign law only if defendant is a resident of the forum
at the time of suit, and such a requirement has properly been ignored
in those states having no such legislation.
CONCLUSION

Based on a desire to keep conflict of laws rules abreast of the increasing inclination to shift residence from one state to another, most
states have enacted so-called borrowing statutes of limitation. Such
legislation is necessary if ambulatory defendants are ultimately
entitled to repose and if plaintiffs are to be compelled to avail themselves of judicial enforcement of their causes of action within a reasonable time. The common law rule characterizing limitation rules
as procedural rather than substantive is inadequate. Since the common law calls for application of the forum's own prescriptive rules,
including its provision tolling limitations while defendant is absent
from the forum, a cause of action against a non-resident defendant
might never be barred in the forum if defendant continues his nonresident status. Perpetual personal responsibility for a bona fide
obligation is perhaps justifiable, but perpetual access to overburdened
courts for the purpose of enforcing claims clouded by unreasonable
lapse of time is not.
Although the policy factors prompting enactment of borrowing
legislation are meritorious, the wording used by the various state
legislatures has not always accomplished the objectives sought. The
requirement that the cause of action have its initial contacts outside
the forum might result in no repose in the forum for a defendant
who has remained continually amenable to suit in a neighboring
state. The legislative mandate to apply the law of that foreign jurisdiction in which plaintiff's cause of action "arose," "accrued," or
"originated" often causes unnecessary confusion and obfuscation
196. E.g., Fisher v. Burk, 123 Miss. 781, 86 So. 300 (1920); Robinson v. Moore,
76 Miss. 89, 23 So. 631 (1898); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Pool, 72 Miss. 413, 16 So. 753

(1895).
197. E.g., Robinson v. Moore, supra note 196; Continental Supply Co. v.
Hutchings, 267 S.V.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
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of policy factors underlying borrowing statutes. Exceptions created to
favor resident plaintiffs or to encourage immigration to the forum
are based on pride, not on justifiable policy. In addition to these
instances of inept legislation, the courts have occasionally been guilty
of mechanically applying a borrowing statute to a factual situation
calling for more thoughtful analysis of both statute and case precedent.
In short, more artfully drawn borrowing legislation is necessary.
Is the answer a characterization of statutes of limitation as rules
of substantive law rather than rules of procedure? Limitations are
substantive in the sense that plaintiff is denied relief once the prescribed period has expired. Since plaintiff's cause of action is extinguished as far as judicial enforcement is concerned, are limitation
rules which destroy his right to obtain a judgment any less "substantive" than other rules which directly affect defendant's liability?
On the other hand, limitations are procedural in the sense that they
extinguish only plaintiff's remedy, not the underlying obligation. If
the proper characterization is "procedural," the forum is to apply
its own rules, including its absent defendant tolling provision; if
"substantive," the forum applies appropriate foreign law, including
the foreign absent defendant tolling provision. In either case, if
defendant is a non-resident of the jurisdiction whose law is applied
but was amenable to suit in another jurisdiction for its full prescriptive period, action is not barred in the forum notwithstanding
the number of years which have elapsed. Regardless of whether limitations are characterized as substantive or procedural, the same inequity might result. Statutes of limitation, therefore, defy characterization according to traditional conflict of laws rules. The basic
issues involved appear to be issues of policy, and perhaps policy,
rather than principle, should be the guide.
Assuming that the basic policy factors involved are simply to require plaintiffs to institute suit without unreasonable delay and not
to unduly extend the period of defendant's judicial responsibilit)
merely because he moved from one state to another, how can these
policies in statute and case decision be best expressed? Working within
the framework of present borrowing legislation, courts have occasionally been compelled to write strained opinions containing penumbral
reasoning in order to achieve a result consonant with the polic)
underlying such legislation. Other courts have refused to engage in
legal gymnastics and have been persuaded by simple logic that the
wording of the borrowing statute involved, plus the factual situation
presented, can lead to only one decision, although that decision is
difficult to justify on policy grounds. The most expedient solution
would seem to be legislative re-evaluation of existing legislation, and
nationally uniform borrowing statutes would be highly desirable. In
an attempt to cope with this problem, the National Conference of
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Commissioners on Uniform State Laws suggested the following
statute 9 8
"Section 1. As used in this act, 'claim' means any right of
action which may be asserted in a civil action or proceeding
and includes, but is not limited to, a right of action created
by statute.
"Section 2. The period of limitation applicable to a claim
accruing outside of this state shall be either that prescribed
by the law of the place where the claim accrued or by the law
of this state, whichever bars the claim."
Proposed section 2 has several advantages. Residence or nonresidence in the forum is of no consequence, and prompt litigation
is encouraged by the provision that either foreign or domestic law
may be applied, depending upon which bars plaintiff's action. However, section 2 is applicable only to a "claim accruing outside of this
state." If a cause of action accrues in the forum, but shortly thereafter defendant moves to State A, where he resides at the time of
suit, section 2 is not applicable. The prescriptive period of State A
can not be borrowed because plaintiff's claim accrued in the forum.
The forum would apply its own limitation rules, including its absent
defendant tolling provision, and plaintiff could bring suit in the
forum regardless of the period of time that has elapsed. On the other
hand, assume that the claim did accrue outside the forum, thus invoking section 2. Assume further that defendant has never been a
resident of the forum, that the claim accrued in State X, where defendant resided for a portion of its prescriptive period, and that at the
time of suit defendant has been a resident of State Y long enough to
create a bar according to the laws of that state. Section 2 calls for
application of the law of the forum or of State X, but not the law
of State Y. If either the law of the forum or of State X, which would
include the absent defendant tolling provision of the appropriate
state, is applied, plaintiff's action is not barred in the forum, although fully barred according to the law of State Y. In such situations, section 2 does not compel litigation within a reasonable time.
In addition to this deficiency, section 2 perpetuates present confusion
by requiring the forum to determine where and how many times a
cause of action "accrues."
An alternative statute was suggested, though not approved by a
majority of the conference. This alternative provision imposes an additional requirement: that the forum disregard any foreign statute
which might toll a borrowed period of limitation. 99 This is analogous
198.

HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM

STATE LAWs 264 (1957).

199.

"The period of limitation applicable to a claim accruing outside of
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to the Ohio rule, which calls for application of an appropriate foreign
period but disregards any absent defendant tolling provision. For
example, if the claim "accrued" in State X, where the appropriate
period is ten years, plaintiff's action will be barred in the forum if
suit is not prosecuted within that period, even though defendant was
a resident of State X for only two years. Such a rule obviously encourages prompt litigation in the forum. However, neither the alternative statute nor the Ohio rule takes cognizance of the delay in
bringing suit caused by a defendant who moves from one state to
another. Even the most diligent plaintiff will experience some unavoidable delay when his obligor shifts residence. If ten years is a
reasonable period in which to institute suit if defendant continuously
remained in State X, is it also a reasonable period if defendant caused
unavoidable delay by emigrating from that state?
Another possible solution is to permit the forum to borrow the
law of any jurisdiction in which defendant has remained subject to
200
suit for the full period provided by the law of that jurisdiction.
The rationale underlying statutes of limitation is to compel plaintiffs to take advantage of the opportunity to sue within a reasonable
period of time. Opportunity to sue necessarily involves defendant's
amenability to suit, and if the forum is to apply the law of any jurisdiction in which defendant has been continually subject to suit,
amenability to service of process is the controlling factor in the
forum's selection of appropriate limitation laws. The forum is not
restricted by the notion that a cause of action can "arise" at only
one point in time and in only one place. Should defendant be subject to suit in more than one jurisdiction at the same time, or in a
number of successive jurisdictions, the forum could apply the law
of any such jurisdiction, provided defendant was amenable to suit
for its full prescriptive period. Thus, emphasis is properly placed upon
plaintiff's failure to take advantage of the opportunity to sue. However, such a statute has at least one serious defect: it does not eliminate
the possibility of perpetual or unduly extended liability. If defendant
has resided for nine years in each of three different states and the
appropriate period of limitation is ten years in each state, the forum
this state shall be the period fixed by the law of the place where the claim accrued,
disregarding any provision which may operate to suspend, toll, interrupt or extend
the running of that period."
200. Professor Vernon proposed such a statute and worded it in the following manner: "If a claim against a person who has been amendable [sic] to service
of process in any jurisdiction within the United States for its entire statutory period
of limitations is barred by the limitation laws of that jurisdiction, whether such
bar is deemed remedial or substantive, it shall be barred in this state." Statutes
of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 RocKY MT. L. REv.
287, 328 (1960).
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must apply its own limitation rules. Even though twenty-seven years
have elapsed, plaintiff's action is not barred because defendant was
not subject to suit in any one state for its entire statutory period. Ifdefendant has never been a resident of the forum, the forum's period
is suspended because of defendant's absence.
The many variables involved make it extremely difficult to draft
borrowing legislation which will effectively compel reasonably prompt
litigation in all cases. Perhaps the answer lies in a modification of
the idea that plaintiff's action might be barred by the law of any
jurisdiction in which defendant remained continually amenable to
service of process. Since limitations operate to bar a cause of action
because of plaintiff's failure to avail himself of judicial machinery
within a reasonable time, consideration should be given to the plaintiff's opportunity to sue in an available forum. But, while proper
weight should be given to defendant's amenability to service of process, any possibility of perpetual liability should be avoided. A
statute worded as follows might accomplish both objectives:2 01
No action shall be maintained in this state if barred by the
limitation laws of the jurisdiction in which defendant resided
when the claim against him first became subject to enforcement
by judicial proceeding. Provided, however, that if the laws
of such jurisdiction toll or suspend the running of its period
of limitation due to the absence of defendant from that jurisdiction, action must be commenced in this state no later than
five years after the time when the limitation period of such
jurisdiction would have expired had defendant remained continually amenable to action in such jurisdiction.
Several effects of such a statute should be noted. First, the choice
of appropriate limitations is properly based on defendant's amenability
to suit. However, if defendant was a resident of several successive
jurisdictions, the forum need look only to the law of the jurisdiction
in which defendant resided when suit first became possible. Although
it might be argued that the law of each successive jurisdiction should
be considered, it is the law of the jurisdiction in which defendant
resided when litigation initially became possible which first exposed
201. The five year figure is not suggested as a magic number; a limitation of
three years, ten years, etc., might be substituted. Regardless of defendant's lack
of bad faith, his move from one state to another will cause plaintiff some unavoidable delay, and his absence from the jurisdiction whose law is borrowed obviously
affects plaintiff's opportunity to sue in that jurisdiction. Thus, such tolling provisions should be borrowed along with the foreign period of limitation, but they
should not operate to extend unduly the period of defendant's judicial liability.
A maximum extension of five years would seem to give plaintiff ample opportunity
to locate a perambulating defendant and institute suit.
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plaintiff to the necessity of bringing timely suit. This initial jurisdiction, therefore, is the one having primary contact with the timeliness of plaintiff's suit, and application of its limitation rules would
be proper. Second, once the forum has determined that the laws ol
a particular jurisdiction should be applied, all rules pertaining to
limitations which would be applied by the courts of that jurisdiction
should also be applied by the forum. This would include, but would
not be limited to, statutory provisions which toll limitation periods
while defendant is absent from the enacting state. However, the fiveyear proviso concerning such tolling provisions would operate to prevent the possibility of perpetual liability. If called upon to borrow
a State X ten-year period, the forum would apply both the ten-year
period and all appropriate State X tolling provisions. But in no
event would defendant's absence for State X operate to subject him to
suit in the forum after a total period of fifteen years has expired.
Third, if defendant is a resident of the forum when suit against him
first became possible, the suggested statute would not operate to
"borrow" foreign law but would call for application of domestic rules.
In such a case, the proviso concerning absent defendant tolling provisions would operate as a limitation on the forum's own tolling
statute. 20 2 The policy behind such tolling provisions is justifiable;
the plaintiff's action should not be barred by the limitation laws of
a jurisdiction in which defendant has not remained continuall)
amenable to service of process. However, a statute which provides
for indefinite suspension does not induce timely litigation and often
disregards the reasonableness of plaintiff's delay in bringing suit. If
domestic limitations are extended for a maximum of five years, plaintiff is prompted to seek judicial enforcement within a reasonable time,
although this might entail resort to the courts of a sister state. At
the same time, the period within which he must sue is sufficiently extended to allow for inconvenience and delay incident to litigation in
a foreign jurisdiction.203

The proposed statute, applicable to all causes of action regardless
of whether they "arise" in the forum or elsewhere, calls for application of either foreign or domestic law and properly bases the choice on
202.

In order to avoid possible confusion and to make it clear that defendant's

absence from the
period of time, it
absent defendant
might be used as a
203.

forum will toll domestic limitations for a specific maximum
might be advisable to add the five year proviso to the forum's
tolling statute. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §52-590 (Supp. 1959)
model for this purpose.

Two other characteristics of the proposed statute might be noted. Under

this statute plaintiff's residence in the forum is immaterial, thus eliminating discrimination in favor of local obligors. In making its choice of appropriate limitation laws the forum need not resolve where, or how many times, a cause of
action "arises." It need only resolve the question of fact as to where defendant
resided when he first became subject to court action.
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defendant's amenability to suit when plaintiff's cause of action was
first exposed to limitations. In addition, such a statute prevents undue extension of the period of defendant's judicial responsibility
merely because he did not remain amenable to suit in a single jurisdiction for its full prescriptive period. On the other hand, reasonable
additional time is allowed to compensate for delay caused by a defendant who moves from one state to another. Thus, suit must
be brought within a reasonable time, even in those cases in which
defendant does not repress his peregrinatory inclinations.

APPENDIX A
A SUGGESTED GROUPING OF BORROWING STATUTES ACCORDING TO THEIR
BASIC REQUIREMENTS

1

2

The statutes are presented in outline form according to their requirements.
Ten jurisdictions are excluded because of the absence of a borrowing statute of

1. For other suggested classifications of borrowing statutes, see Proyect, A
Study of the Uniform Statute and the Present State of the Law Limiting Claims
Arising in Foreign States, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 123 (1958); Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKy MT. L. REv. 287,
294-96 (1960). Both studies evolved from the 1957 promulgation of a "Uniform
Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act." HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 264 (1957).
2. Thirty-eight states, the Canal Zone, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands have borrowing statutes of general application: ALA. CODE tit. 7, §37 (1960);
ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. §55-2-23 (1949); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-506 (A) (1956);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §361; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §87-1-21 (1953); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, §8120 (1953); FLA. STAT. §95.10 (1961); HAWAH RFv. LAvs §241-8
(1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. §5-239 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §21 (Smith-Hurd
1959); IND. ANN. STAT. §2-606 (Supp. 1959); IOWA CODE ANN. §614.7 (1946); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §60-310 (1949); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §413.320 (1955); LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 3532 (West 1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 112, §111 (1954);
MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 260, §9 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. §541.14 (1959); Miss. CODE
ANN. §741 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. §516.180 (1949); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
§93-2717 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. §25-215 (1956); Nav. REv. STAT. §11.020 (1959);
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT §13; N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-21 (Supp. 1959); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. §2305.20 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §99 (1951); ORE. REv. STAT.
§12.260 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §39 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §9-1-18
(1956); TENN. CODE ANN. §28-114 (1955); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5542
(1958); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-45 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. §8-23 (1957); WASH.
R v. CODE ANN. §4.16.290 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. §5409 (1955); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§330.205 (Supp. 1961); Wvo. STAT. ANN. §1-25 (1957); C.Z. CODE tit. 4, §111 (1934);
GUAM CODE CIV. PROC. §361 (1953); P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 32, §263 (1954); Vsa. Is.
CODE tit. 5, §41 (1957).
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general application.3 The District of Columbia,4 New Jersey,5 and Vermont 6 are
omitted because their statutes are of limited application.
A.

Where must the cause of action come from?
1. It must arise in some jurisdiction other than the forum - Alaska, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, Canal
Zone, Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands.
2. It must accrue in some jurisdiction other than the forum - Mississippi,
Montana, Rhode Island, Tennessee.
3. It must originate in some jurisdiction other than the forum - Missouri.
4. It must be based on a contract made or an act done in another jurisdiction
- Alabama.
5. It must be based on a contract made and to be performed in another
jurisdiction -Virginia, West Virginia.
6. It must be based on injuries received in another jurisdiction - Wisconsin.
7. No specific indication as to where the cause of action must have had its
basic contacts - Arizona, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Texas.
With the exception of group 7, the cause of action must not have had its
primary contact with the enacting jurisdiction. In regard to group 7, if reference
is made only to the wording of the statutes involved, it may be argued that the
borrowing provisions are applicable even though the cause of action had its primary contact with the enacting jurisdiction.
B.

Requirements relating to the residence of the parties at the time the cause of
action arose:
1. Both plaintiff and defendant must have been non-residents - Alaska, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, Virgin Islands.
2. The only residence requirement mentioned relates to the citizenship or
residence of plaintiff; no similar express requirement in regard to defendant a. The borrowing statute is not applicable if plaintiff was a citizen of the
enacting jurisdiction and held the cause of action since it was first
recognized - California, Idaho, Minnesota, Nevada, Utah, Guam, Puerto
Rico.
b. The borrowing statute is not applicable if plaintiff was a resident of the
enacting jurisdiction and held the cause of action since it was first
recognized- Delaware, Hawaii, New York, North Carolina, Canal Zone.
c. Plaintiff must have been a resident of the foreign jurisdiction to which
reference is made and must have resided there for the full statutory
period of limitation - Massachusetts, Rhode Island.
d. Plaintiff must have been a resident of the foreign jurisdiction in which
he received the personal injuries upon which his action is based Wisconsin.

3. Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota.
4. The District of Columbia statute is applicable only in regard to enforcement
of foreign judgments. D.C. CODE ANN. §12-203 (1961).
5. The New Jersey borrowing statute is applicable only in regard to enforcement of foreign judgments. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:14-5 (1952).
6. The Vermont statute deals only with the narrow subject of the liability of
stockholders and foreign corporations. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §510 (1959).
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3. The only residence requirement mentioned relates to the residence of
defendant; no similar express requirement in regard to plaintiffa. Defendant must have been a non-resident of the forum-Arizona, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, Tennessee, Texas.
b. Defendant must have been a resident of the foreign jurisdiction in
which the contract was made or act done -Alabama.
c. Defendant must have been a resident of a foreign jurisdiction, but only
if that jurisdiction is one other than that in which the cause of action
accrued - Mississippi.

d. Defendant must have been a resident of the foreign jurisdiction in which
the contract was made and was to be performed -Virginia, West Virginia.
4. The statute contains no express requirement relating to the residence of
either plaintiff or defendant- Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wyoming.
C. Assuming that the borrowing statute is applicable, what law will be applied to
determine whether plaintiffs cause of action is barred in the forum?
1. Statutes requiring application of the statute of limitations of some foreign
jurisdiction in which one or both of the parties resided. The applicable
law is that of the jurisdiction in which
a. all of the parties have resided- Maine,
b. plaintiff has resided - Massachusetts,
c. defendant has resided; these statutes may be classified according to
those that apply the law of the jurisdiction
(1) from which defendant has migrated - Arizona, Texas,
(2) in which defendant has "previously" resided - Iowa,
(3) in which defendant has resided - Montana.
2. Statutes requiring application of some foreign law, but which make no
express reference to the residence of either of the parties. The applicable
law is that of the jurisdiction in which
a. the cause of action arose -Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, Canal Zone, Guam,
Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands; but if the forum's period of limitation is
shorter, it is to be applied - Delaware, New York, Ohio,
b. the cause of action accrued, but if the forum's period of limitation is
shorter, it is to be applied - Kentucky,
c. the cause of action originated- Missouri,

d. the "contract or obligation is to be performed" - Louisiana,
e. the plaintiff received the personal injuries for which he brings the
present action - Wisconsin.
3. Statutes combining the factors mentioned in 1 and 2 above. The applicable
law is that of the jurisdiction in which
a. the cause of action arose and defendant resided -Indiana, Rhode Island,
b. the cause of action accrued and defendant resided -Tennessee,
c. the cause of action accrued, or in which defendant has previously resided - Mississippi,

d. the contract was made or act done, provided that defendant must have
been a resident of that jurisdiction -Alabama,
e. defendant resided and the contract was made and to be performed, or
the law of the forum -Virginia, West Virginia.
4. The Nebraska statute calls for application of the laws of any other juris-
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diction, but only if the action would have been barred had defendant
been a resident of Nebraska and its own period of limitation applied.
In addition to these basic requirements, several miscellaneous factors should be
mentioned. (1) In all but seven of the jurisdictions under consideration,7 the
borrowing statute expressly applies to a cause of action arising in a foreign county;
in these seven jurisdictions the same applicability would seem to result by implication. (2) In four states, the borrowing statute is not applicable unless defendant
is a resident of the forum at the time action is commenced.8 (3) A borrowing
statute which is general in its scope is apparently applied when plaintiff seeks
enforcement of a foreign judgment;9 however, statutes in eight states specifically
borrow foreign limitation laws for this purpose.10 (4) Six jurisdictions have enacted provisions attempting to establish a maximum period of time during which
a foreign cause of action may be enforced." (5) Two separate and distinct phrases
have been written into a limited number of borrowing statutes and have given
the courts unwarranted difficulty: fully barred, found in four statutes, 12 and like
causes of action, found in three.13
APPENDIX B
A

SUGGESTED CLASSIFICATION BASED UPON RELATED GROUPS OF BORROWING STATUTES

HAVING IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR PROVISIONS

Because of the multifarious nature of borrowing legislation, it
select a small sampling which accurately illustrates a significantly
statutes containing identical or internally consistent provisions.
are a few small groups of statutes which have combined basic
such a way that they are internally consistent.
Group 1 may be illustrated by the California statute:1 4

is impossible to
large number of
However, there
requirements in

"When a cause of action has arisen in another state, or in a foreign
country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon
shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one
who has been a citizen of this state, and who has held the cause of action
from the time it accrued."
This is the largest single group of internally consistent statutes; similar provisions
are found in almost identical terms in six other jurisdictions.5
7. Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Texas.
8. Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas.
9. See Bemis v. Stanley, 93 Ill. 230 (1879); Chaloupka v. Martin, 179 Iowa
1173, 162 N.W. 567 (1917); Chevrier v. Robert, 6 Mont. 319, 12 Pac. 702 (1887);
Shannon v. Shannon, 193 Ore. 575, 238 P.2d 744 (1952).
10. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-549 (1956); D.C. CODE ANN. §12-203 (1961);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §413.330 (1955); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3532 (West 1952);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:14-5 (1952); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5530 (1958); VA.
CODE ANN. §8-22 (1957); W. VA. CODE ANN. §5405 (1955).
11. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-507 (1956); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §87-1-22
(1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §52-590 (Supp. 1959); HAWAII REV. LAWS §241-6
(1955); TEx. REV. Cmv. STAT. ANN. art. 5543 (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §1-16 (1957).
12.

Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Pennsylvania.

13.
14.
15.

Delaware, Kentucky, Ohio.
CAL. Clv. PROC. CODE §361. (Emphasis added.)
Idaho, Minnesota, Nevada, Utah, Guam, Puerto Rico.
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Group 2 may be illustrated by the borrowing statute enacted in the Canal
Zone:6
"When a cause of action has arisen in a State of the United States, or in
a foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there
be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action
thereon shall not be maintained against him in the Canal Zone, except in
favor of one who has been a resident of the Zone, and who has held the
cause of action from the time it accrued."
Statutes containing identical provisions may be found in two other jurisdictions.'7
The only difference between this group and group 1 is the requirement based on
the residence of plaintiff rather than his citizenship.
Group 3 may be illustrated by section 13 of the New York Civil Practice Act:
"Where a cause of action arises outside of this state, an action cannot
be brought in a court of this state to enforce such cause of action after the
expiration of the time limited by the laws either of this state or of the state
or country where the cause of action arose, for bringing an action upon the
cause of action, except that where the cause of action originally accrued in
favor of a resident of this state, the time limited by the laws of this state
shall apply .... " (Emphasis added.)
Delaware has a statute containing identical provisions.s
These three groups all require that the cause of action arise in another state
and contain an exception in favor of domestic citizens or residents. Only group 3,
however, expressly provides that the forum's period of limitation is to be applied
if it is shorter.
9
Group 4 consists of five states' and the Virgin Islands and may be illustrated
20
by the Oregon statute:
"When the cause of action has arisen in another state, territory or
country, between nonresidents of this state, and by the laws of the state,
territory or country where the cause of action arose, an action cannot be
maintained thereon by reason of the lapse of time, no action shall be maintained thereon in this state."
Two features distinguish this group from the first three: The statute is expressly
applicable only if the parties were non-residents when the cause of action arose,
and no exception is made in favor of a citizen or resident plaintiff.
Group 5 also consists of five states,21 and the Illinois legislation is typical:22
"When a cause of action has arisen in a state or territory out of this
state, or in a foreign country, and, by the laws thereof, an action thereon
cannot be maintained by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon
shall not be maintained in this state."
This species of borrowing statute is identical with those found in the first two
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

C.Z. CODE tit. 4, §111 (1934). (Emphasis added.)
Hawaii, North Carolina.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §8120 (1953).
Alaska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington.
ORE. REv. STAT. §12.260 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Wyoming.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §21 (Smith-Hurd 1959). (Emphasis added.)
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groups, but with no exception in favor of a resident or citizen plaintiff. Note that
the statutes in this group do not contain an express requirement that the forum's
statute of limitations is applicable if shorter, nor do they specifically require nonresidence at the time the cause of action arose.
2
23
Group 6, composed of two states, may be illustrated by the Ohio statute: '
"If the laws of any state or country where a cause of action arose limit
the time for the commencement of the action to a lesser number of years
than do the statutes of this state in like causes of action then said cause
of action shall be barred in this state at the expiration of said lesser number
of years."
Except for the absence of an exception in favor of the plaintiff, the two statutes
in this group most closely resemble those of New York and Delaware, mentioned
in group 3. However, because of the phrase like causes of action, these statutes
must be placed in a separate category.
Group 7 consists of Virginia and West Virginia; the statute of either may be
25
cited, since they have a common source:
"Upon a contract which was made and was to be performed in another
state or country by a person who then resided therein, no action shall be
maintain after the right of action thereon is barred either by the laws of
such state or country or [by the laws] of this State."
Though the statutes in this group and those in group 8 have characteristics in
common with the other borrowing statutes, each of these two groups forms its
own island, and a comparison with other borrowing statutes would be of little
practical value.
Group 8 is comprised of Arizona and Texas. Both statutes are substantially
the same, and the Texas legislation is illustrative:26
"No action shall be brought against an immigrant to recover a claim
which was barred by the law of limitation of the State or country from
which he emigrated ...."
Although forty-two jurisdictions have borrowing statutes of general application,
only twenty-nine are represented in these groupings; the remaining statutes fall
within individual pigeonholes. Since they are all represented in the more comprehensive classification based on essential requirements, it would serve no practical
purpose merely to list them.

23. Kentucky, Ohio.
24. OnIo REV. CODE ANN. §2305.20 (Page 1954). (Emphasis added.)
25. VA. CODE ANN. §8-23 (1950).
26. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5542 (1958).
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